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“Your medical data is for sale – all of it.”1 This warning comes from 
Adam Tanner, of Harvard’s Institute for Quantitative Social Science, who has 
published extensively on the topic of the business of selling medical records.2 
When you visit your doctor, you may think “I’m telling my doctor my most 
intimate medical secrets, and only my doctor knows about it.”3 Frequently, 
however, your medical records are being sold,4 including your “[p]rescription 
records, blood tests, doctor notes, hospital visits and insurance records.”5  
 
This is a big business. Three quarters of all retail pharmacies in the U.S.6 
sell their patients’ prescription records and healthcare information, as do major 
health insurers, such as UnitedHealth, Anthem and Blue Cross Blue Shield.7 Your 
medical records are often sold to data brokers who consolidate them into a 
comprehensive profile about you. One data broker, for example, boasts of having 
“500 million comprehensive, longitudinal anonymous patient records” sourced 
from “over 100,000 data suppliers.”8 Another advertises the ability to create 
“healthcare journeys”9 about patients created from a “collection of claims data for 
 
1 Sam Thielman, Your private medical data is for sale – and it's driving a business worth billions, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/10/medical-
data-multibilliondollar-business-report-warns. 
2 See, e.g., Adam Tanner, Our Bodies, Our Data: How Companies Make Billions Selling Our 
Medical Records (2017); Adam Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data (Jan. 
10, 2017) [hereinafter Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data], https://production-
tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2017/01/11165252/strengthening-protection-of-patient-medical-data-
1.pdf; Adam Tanner , The Hidden Global Trade in Patient Medical Data, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE 
(Jan. 24, 2017) [hereinafter The Hidden Trade in Medical Data], 
https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/hidden-global-trade-patient-medical-data; Adam Tanner, How 
Your Medical Data Fuels a Hidden Multi-Billion Dollar Industry, TIME (Jan. 9, 2017) [hereinafter 
Your Medical Data Fuels Hidden Industry], http://time.com/4588104/medical-data-industry; 
Adam Tanner , How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records, SCI. AM. (Feb. 1, 
2016) [hereinafter How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records], 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-data-brokers-make-money-off-your-
medicalrecords.  
3 Thielman, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 Tanner, Your Medical Data Fuels Hidden Industry, supra note 2. 
6 Tanner, How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records, supra note 2. 
7 Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data, supra note 2, at 7. 
8 IMS HEALTH HOLDINGS, INC. ANN. REP. (2016), at 8. 
9 Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data , supra note 2, at 8. 
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280 million patients.”10 A New York City-based start-up claims to possess, as of 
the date of this writing, 29 billion lab records of 250 million patients sourced from 
leading national clinical labs, such as LabCorp and Quest Diagnostics, as well as 
oncology and genetic testing labs.11 A San Francisco-based start-up claims to 
have a “health map” that “links 150 complete real-time datasets for more than 320 
million patients.”12  
 
These profiles allow data brokers to track your diagnoses, prescriptions, 
lab tests and more, as you interact with the healthcare system. Brokers advertise 
their ability to create “patient journeys,”13 fine-tuned enough that if you visit a 
CVS in Cleveland one day, and a Walgreens in Miami the next, or visit different 
doctors in those cities, the broker will know.14 Data brokers seeking to downplay 
the risks to patient privacy may refer to a patient’s medical records as a 
“byproduct,” “exhaust,” or an “asset” of the healthcare organization to be sold.15 
But this “exhaust” is the medical records of millions of patients containing the 
categories of sensitive information one reasonably expects in medical records. 
Brokers can not only track a patient’s use of prescription drugs, they can also 
glean “insights” about that patient based on sensitive portions of his medical 
history, such as his psychiatric history, substance dependency, STDs or history of 
physical or sexual abuse. 
 
Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
and its data protection regulations (collectively referred to hereinafter as 
 
10 PRA Health Sciences acquires Symphony Health, scrip and prescriber data provider, PHARM. 
COMMERCE (Aug. 17, 2017), https://pharmaceuticalcommerce.com/business-and-finance/pra-
health-sciences-acquires-symphony-health-solutions-scrip-prescriber-data-provider. 
11 PROGNOS HEALTH INC., https://prognoshealth.com/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
12 Press Release, Komodo Health, Veradigm and Komodo Health Partner to Create the Largest 
Linked HER and Claims Dataset for Life Sciene Research (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://www.komodohealth.com/insights/2019/08/veradigm-and-komodo-health-partner-to-create-
the-largest-linked-ehr-and-claims-dataset-for-life-science-research. 
13 See, e.g., KOMODO HEALTH INC., https://www.komodohealth.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2020) 
(advertising the ability to “unlock the truth about the patient journey through the U.S. healthcare 
system.”).  
14 Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data , supra note 2, at 11. 
15 Id. at 7 (quoting former IMS executive: “We used to say, ‘Look, you are creating data as a 
byproduct. It’s an exhaust from your system. Why don’t you take that thing and turn it into an 
asset and sell it?’ That is the way we would get people to think about data as an asset …”).  
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HIPAA),16 it is illegal for a healthcare organization17 to sell a patient’s18 medical 
information without first obtaining the patient’s written authorization.19 
Healthcare organizations and their data brokers may be seeking to bypass 
HIPAA’s prohibition by describing the patient medical information they transact 
in as “anonymized” or “de-identified.” Such assertions, however, are rarely – if 
ever – verified by regulators or independent standards-setting bodies.  
 
This lack of oversight may be coming at a price being paid by patients 
who lose their privacy in the process. “Data scientists,” Tanner notes, can link 
these patient profiles with consumer profiles “with a surprising degree of 
accuracy.”20 This is a natural consequence of the fact that when enough 
information is added to any patient’s profile, a broker will eventually obtain the 
ability to identify that patient. Prominent security researcher, Ross Anderson, 
noted this phenomenon when evaluating a proposal for creating a database of 
 
16 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, adding a 
new Part C to Title XI of the Social Security Act, comprising sections 1171–1179 of the Social 
Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. 1320d–8 (Aug. 21, 1996); as amended by the Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act or HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
5 (Feb. 17, 2009), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, including Standards for Privacy of 
Individually Identifiable Health Information, codified at 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164 (Dec. 28, 
2000; last amended, Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Privacy Rule]; Health Insurance Reform: Security 
Standards, codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and Subparts A (General Provisions) and C (Security 
Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information) of Part 164 (Security and 
Privacy) (Feb. 20, 2003; last amended, Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Security Rule]; Notification in 
the Case of Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information, codified at 45 C.F.R. Subpart D 
(Aug. 24, 2009; last amended Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Breach Notification Rule]; and Civil 
Money Penalties; Procedures for Investigations, Imposition of Penalties, and Hearings, 
Department of Health and Human Services, codified 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164 (Apr. 17, 2003, 
last amended, Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Enforcement Rule].  
17 HIPAA’s provisions apply to organizations that it calls “covered entities” and “business 
associates.” Covered entities includes a wide range of “health care providers,” including hospitals, 
medical practices, pharmacies, clinical labs and many others; to health insurers, which HIPAA 
calls “health plans;” and to entities that process medical claims, known as “health care 
clearinghouses.” The term “business associate” applies to organizations that provide services to 
covered entities that require the organization to receive access to identifiable information about the 
covered entities’ patients or beneficiaries. See definitions for “covered entity,” “health care 
provider,” “health plan,” “health care clearinghouse,” and “business associate” in 45 C.F.R. § 
160.103. For brevity, this Article refers to covered entities and business associates collectively as 
“healthcare organizations.”  
18 HIPAA uses the term “individual” to refer to a “person who is subject of protected health 
information,” which is, subject to limited exceptions, individually identifiable health information 
transmitted or maintained by healthcare organizations. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. Most frequently 
“individuals” are patients of a healthcare provider and/or beneficiaries or members of a health 
plan. Outside of HIPAA, the term “individual” has many other meanings. Because the term 
“individual” has ambiguous meanings outside of HIPAA, for clarity this Article refers to 
“individuals” as “patients.”   
19 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(a)(5)(ii), 164.508(a)(4). 
20 Thielman, supra note 1.  
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Iceland’s medical, genealogy and genetic data.21 In examining the proposal, 
Anderson noted that “it is effectively impossible to de-identify … records … 
which link together all (or even many) of the health care encounters in a patient’s 
life.”22 “For this reason,” Anderson concluded, “a database of [such] medical 
records must be considered to be personal health information.”23 
 
Despite the red flags, observers often acquiesce to the notion that these 
large volumes of sensitive medical information are “de-identified” in accordance 
with HIPAA’s requirements. Tanner, for example, summarizes his belief that 
“IMS and other data brokers are not restricted by medical privacy rules in the 
U.S., because their records are designed to be anonymous:”24  
“On the surface, it might seem impossible for a data miner to link 
anonymized information about a patient from separate sources—CVS at 
home in Cleveland today, but at Walgreens while on vacation in Miami 
Beach next month—or from different doctors in these cities. Yet data 
miners are able to match these files by getting pharmacies, insurers, 
testing labs, electronic health record systems, and other suppliers to all 
install the same de-identification software (for which they compensate the 
data suppliers). 
 
This software removes the personal details for each individual—such as 
name, address, telephone number, and Social Security number—but 
assigns that person the same anonymous patient identification key across 
all locations using that de-identification system. ‘If they install that de-ID 
engine at every source and it has the same algorithm, that means everyone 
with the same PHI (personal health information) will get the same IMS 
patient key,’ says Mark Degatano, who has advised IMS Health and 
worked at rival data miner Symphony Health. 
 
The ‘De-ID engine’ allows data miners to assemble a patient dossier with 
thousands of data points spanning back years. The file does not include a 
name, but lists age and gender, as well as what section of Cleveland she 
lives in.” 25 
 
21 Ross Anderson, The DeCODE Proposal for an Icelandic Health Database (Oct. 20, 1998), 
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/iceland.pdf. 
22 Id. at 3. 
23 Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
24 Tanner, How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records, supra note 2. 
25 Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data , supra note 2, at 11. 
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This process, Tanner concludes, complies with HIPAA because “[HIPAA] 
governs only the transfer of medical information that is tied directly to an 
individual's identity.”26 
 
Tanner synopsis of HIPAA, however, is incorrect. HIPAA’s protections 
have never been limited to information that is “tied directly to an individual’s 
identity.” On the contrary, HIPAA’s protections have always applied to “any 
information … [with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe] … 
can be used to identify a patient.27 Simply removing your direct identifiers (such 
as your name, telephone number, address or social security number) from your 
medical records has never been viewed of as sufficient to allow your doctor to sell 
your medical records. As noted by Judge Posner when considering whether the 
medical records of forty-five women who had received abortions where 
adequately protected because their direct identifiers had been “redacted:” 
“Some of these women will be afraid that … persons of their 
acquaintance, or skillful ‘Googlers,’ sifting the information contained in 
the medical records concerning each patient's medical and sex history, will 
put two and two together, ‘out’ the 45 women, and thereby expose them to 
threats, humiliation, and obloquy. As the court pointed out in Parkson v. 
Central DuPage Hospital … ‘whether the patients’ identities would 
remain confidential by the exclusion of their names and identifying 
numbers is questionable at best. The patients’ admit and discharge 
summaries arguably contain histories of the patients' prior and present 
medical conditions, information that in the cumulative can make the 
possibility of recognition very high.”28 
 
In addition to including much of a patient’s medical history, such as a 
patient’s medical appointments, care plans, medical claims, medications, lab and 
radiology tests and results, history of psychiatric care, pregnancy care and dietary 
services,29 medical records also often include a lot of demographic information 
that “in the cumulative can make the possibility of recognition very high,” such as 
the patient’s date of birth, gender, geography of residence, languages spoken and 
marital status,30 as well as the patient’s birth place, adoption information, 
citizenship, nationality, disabilities, religion and places of religious 
 
26 Tanner, How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records, supra note 2 (emphasis 
added). 
27 42 U.S.C § 1320d–6 (emphasis added). 
28 Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 




congregation.31 They may also include demographic information and medical 
histories of the patient’s family members, including family members’ ages, 
locations and medical conditions.32  
 
HIPAA recognizes this reality by protecting medical records that describe 
aspects of your life that can be used to identify you – such as what town you were 
born in, where you grew up, where you work, or when you were married or got 
divorced. To de-identify your medical records, therefore, your doctor must 
remove all the information that can be used to identify you, not just directly but 
also indirectly. 
 
Tanner’s confusion about HIPAA’s requirements highlights a rarely 
discussed ambiguity in how the label “de-identified” is currently applied to 
medical information in the United States. On the one hand, there is HIPAA’s 
definition of de-identified, which applies to health information that is devoid of 
identifiable information and, therefore, can be disseminated free of HIPAA’s 
comprehensive data protection safeguards. This is the definition used by Federal 
agencies when they de-identify their own medical records for use by researchers 
and the public. It is also the definition discussed by the US Department of Health 
and Human Services (hereinafter referred to as HHS) and HHS’s Office of Civil 
Rights (OCR) in their commentary and guidance regarding de-identification. 
Because HIPAA’s form of de-identified information is devoid of identifying 
information that can be used to harm patients, HIPAA contemplates that it can be 
used and disseminated free of the restrictions HIPAA otherwise applies to 
individually identifiable heath information.33  
 
In the private sector, on the other hand, certain permissive “de-
identification guidelines” give parties significant flexibility in how they apply the 
label “de-identified.” This flexibility can be stretched so far as to label 
information “de-identified” even in circumstances where there is a substantial risk 
that it can be used to identify many, most or all of the patients involved. Because 
this nominally “de-identified” information often can be used to identify patients, 
it presents the same risks to patients as individually identifiable health 
information. If the information is hacked, for example, it could be used to 
discriminate against the patients or blackmail them.34 So it is not a coincidence 
that these permissive “de-identification guidelines” anticipate that their form of 
 
31 Id.; Specification 8.1.16, Resource Patient – Extensions & Profiles, HL7 FHIR RELEASE 4 
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.hl7.org/fhir/patient-profiles.html.  
32 Id.; Specification 94.1 Resource Family Member History – Content, HL7 FHIR RELEASE 4 
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.hl7.org/fhir/familymemberhistory.html#FamilyMemberHistory. 
33 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (“The requirements of [the Privacy Rule] do not apply to 
information that has been de-identified in accordance with the applicable requirements of § 
164.514 …”). 
34 Tanner, The Hidden Global Trade in Medical Data, supra note 2. 
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“de-identified” information will be secured in a manner that, in certain respects, 
echoes what HIPAA requires for individually identifiable health information.  
 
Healthcare organizations and their data broker customers are notoriously 
secretive about their medical records transactions. “Pharmacies prefer not to 
announce that they sell their prescription information,” Tanner notes, and “even [] 
employees are often unaware of the trade.”35 An industry insider notes that, “[i]t 
was forbidden to ever mention that topic … It was the big secret.”36 “The trade in 
patient data is so opaque,” Tanner points out, “that many even in health care and 
government do not know about it.”37  
 
Given this conspicuous secrecy, it is impossible to say which healthcare 
organizations follow HIPAA’s express requirements for de-identification and 
which utilize permissive “de-identification guidelines.” Tanner’s exposé raises a 
number of red flags suggesting HIPAA’s requirements are not always followed.  
 
In light of the confusion invited by applying the label “de-identified” to 
information that can be used to identify patients, it is paramount that regulators, 
compliance professionals, patient advocates and the general public understand the 
significant differences between the standards applied by HIPAA and those applied 
by permissive “de-identification guidelines.” This Article discusses those 
differences in detail. 
 
The discussion proceeds in four Parts. Part II (HIPAA’s Heartbeat: Why 
HIPAA Protects Identifiable Patient Information) examines Congress’s 
motivations for defining individually identifiable health information broadly, 
which included to stop the harms patients endured prior to 1996 arising from the 
commercial sale of their medical records. Part III (Taking the “I” Out of 
Identifiable Information: HIPAA’s Requirements for De-Identified Health 
Information) discusses HIPAA’s requirements for de-identification that were 
never intended to create a loophole for identifiable patient information to escape 
HIPAA’s protections. Part IV (Anatomy of a Hack: Methods for Labeling 
Identifiable information “De-Identified”) examines the goals, methods and results 
of permissive “de-identification guidelines” and compares them to HIPAA’s 
requirements. Part V (Protecting Un-Protected Health Information) evaluates the 
suitability of permissive “de-identification guidelines,” concluding that the 
vulnerabilities inherent in their current articulation render them ineffective as a 
data protection standard. It also discusses ways in which compliance 
professionals, regulators and advocates can foster accountability and transparency 
in the utilization of health information that can be used to identify patients. 
 
 
35 Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data, supra note 2, at 6. 
36 Tanner, How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records, supra note 2. 
37 Tanner, The Hidden Trade in Medical Data, supra note 2. 
 39 
 
II. HIPAA’S HEARTBEAT: WHY HIPAA PROTECTS IDENTIFIABLE PATIENT 
INFORMATION 
 
When Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996,38 it defined “individually identifiable health 
information” to include “any information … that … [either]: 
(i) identifies the individual; or  
(ii) with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe … can be 
used to identify the individual.”39  
Clause (i) covers directly-identifying information in your medical records – often 
called “direct identifiers” or “obvious identifiers” – your name, addresses, social 
security number, your telephone number, and the like.  
 
Your medical history also includes other information that could be used to 
identify you. Even if your direct identifiers are removed, you might be 
identifiable from other information, such as where you were born, where you 
grew up, your education history, where you work, when or if you were married or 
divorced. For that reason, Congress included clause (ii) that applies to any other 
information that reasonably can be used to identify you.  
 
The ability of this “other information” to identify people is widely 
recognized by researchers. Two decades ago, for example, Latanya Sweeney40 
authored a highly-cited study where researchers reported that 87% of the U.S. 
population were likely identifiable if you had access to their gender, date of birth 
and zip code.41 These are sometimes called “indirect identifiers” because they 
only indirectly identify patients. On their own, indirect identifiers are benign. But 
when they are combined within one or more documents (such as a medical record 
or your consolidated medical history), they often can be used to identify the 
patient as easily as if you had her direct identifiers. 
 
Gender, date of birth and zip code are included in most medical records.42 
But they are not the only categories of indirect identifiers. HHS recognized that a 
wide range of information could be combined to identify patients, as is the case 
 
38 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191 (adding a 
new Part C to Title XI of the Social Security Act, comprising sections 1171–1179 of the Social 
Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. 1320d–8 (Aug. 21, 1996)). 
39 42 U.S.C §1320d–6 (emphasis added). 
40 See Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely (Carnegie Mellon 
Univ., Data Privacy, Working Paper 3, Pittsburgh 2000). 
41 Id. at 2. 
42 See, e.g., Specification 8.1.14, Resource Patient – Detailed Descriptions, HL7 FHIR RELEASE 4 
(Nov. 9, 2019), www.hl7.org/fhir/patient-definitions.html (demographics data includes, among 
other categories, gender, date of birth, home address, marital status). 
 40 
when combining a patient’s gender, date of birth, zip code, languages spoken, 
race, diagnoses, dates of service, among other variables: 
“It is not always obvious when information identifies the subject. If the 
name and identifying numbers (e.g., SSN, insurance number, etc.) are 
removed, a person could still be identified by the address. With the 
address removed, the subject of a medical record could be identified based 
on health and demographic characteristics (e.g., age, race, diagnosis).43 
 
Accordingly, “removing only the direct identifiers” has never been 
recognized as an effective means of de-identifying medical records because “the 
resulting information would often remain identifiable, and its dissemination could 
result in significant violations of privacy.”44 As HHS noted: 
“Congress [] intended to go beyond ‘direct’ identification and to 
encompass circumstances in which a reasonable likelihood of 
identification exists. Even after removing ‘direct’ or ‘obvious’ identifiers 
of information, a risk or probability of identification of the subject of the 
information may remain; in some instances, the risk will not be 
inconsequential.”45 
 
The government had compelling reasons to protect all forms of 
identifiable patient information. Before Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996, 
medical information was treated like any asset to be sold on the open market. A 
1994 report, for example, found that 40% of health insurers sold their patients’ 
medical information to lenders, employers and marketers without the patients’ 
permission, or even knowledge.46  
 
Purchasers of patients’ medical information often used that information to 
discriminate against those patients or otherwise harm them. A 30-year FBI 
veteran, for example, was placed on administrative leave because his pharmacy 
informed his employer that he was being treated for depression.47 In a separate 
case, a banker used patient records to cancel mortgages of recently-diagnosed 
cancer patients.48 In another case, a businessman purchased a medical practice 
and held its patient medical records ransom until the patients paid a bounty to 
 
43 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 
59,935 (Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160-164) [hereinafter the 1999 Proposed 
Rule]. 
44 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 
82,708 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160-164) [hereinafter 2000 Final Rule]. 
45 Id. at 82,611. 




purchase their medical records.49 These were not isolated incidents. A 1990 
survey, for example, found that 35% of Fortune 500 companies reviewed “… 
people’s medical records before making hiring and promotion decisions.”50  
 
The commodification of medical information put patients in a “catch-22.” 
On one hand, a patient cannot obtain effective medical care without being candid 
with their doctors, hospitals and pharmacists. On the other hand, the price of that 
candor could result in the patient losing her job, a mortgage, or suffering other 
forms of discrimination or personal embarrassment when her medical records 
were sold to current or future employers, banks and whoever else was interested 
in her medical history.  
 
The harms caused by the free flow of patient health information were so 
widespread, they became a recognized public health concern: 
A 1993 Lou Harris poll found that 75 percent of those surveyed worry that 
medical information from a computerized national health information 
system will be used for many non-health reasons, and 38 percent are very 
concerned … An ACLU Poll in 1994 also found that 75 percent of those 
surveyed are concerned a ‘great deal’ or a ‘fair amount’ about insurance 
companies putting medical information about them into a computer 
information bank to which others have access.51 
 
The lack of privacy protection reduced patients’ “trust in the health care 
system and institutions that serve them.”52 As HHS noted, “[i]ndividuals cannot 
be expected to share the most intimate details of their lives unless they have 
confidence that such information will not be used or shared inappropriately.”53 In 
the environment where patients knew their health information was for sale to the 
highest bidder, many felt compelled to withhold critical information from the 
healthcare system: 
“[O]ne in six Americans reported that they have taken some sort of 
evasive action to avoid the inappropriate use of their information by 
providing inaccurate information to a health care provider, changing 
physicians, or avoiding care altogether.” 54  
 
A 1999 study found that “[t]o protect their privacy and avoid 
embarrassment, stigma, and discrimination, some people withhold information 
 
49 Id. at 82,467. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 82,467 (citing Harris Equifax, HEALTH INFO. PRIVACY STUDY, at 2, 33 (1993)). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 82,467-68. 
54 Id. at 82,468. 
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from their health care providers, provide inaccurate information, doctor-hop to 
avoid a consolidated medical record, pay out-of-pocket for care that is covered by 
insurance, and—in some cases—avoid care altogether.”55  
 
The abuse was so widespread that clinicians often felt compelled to 
protect their patients by censoring what they recorded in their patients’ medical 
records: 
“[T]he Association of American Physicians and Surgeons reported 78 
percent of its members reported withholding information from a patient’s 
record due to privacy concerns and another 87 percent reported having had 
a patient request to withhold information from their records.”56 
 
The lack of privacy protection had become a danger to public health, to 
which Congress responded to by passing HIPAA. The new law not only 
prohibited the commercial exploitation of medical information, but also included 
significant penalties for its violations. If, for example, a violation is committed 
with the intent to “sell, transfer or use” medical information “for commercial 
advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm,” a violator can be imprisoned for up 
to 10 years and fined up to $250,000.57 Congress tasked HHS with implementing 
and monitoring specific rules on how medical information can be appropriately 
used, maintained and disclosed that are today memorialized in four significant and 
holistic data protection regulations known as HIPAA’s Privacy Rule,58 Security 
Rule,59 Breach Notification Rule, 60 and Enforcement Rule.61 All four of these 
regulations protect health information that can be used to identify a patient – 
whether directly or indirectly. 
 
 
III. TAKING THE “I” OUT OF IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION: HIPAA’S 
REQUIREMENTS FOR DE-IDENTIFIED HEALTH INFORMATION 
 
A. Defining Information that Does Not Need to be Protected by HIPAA 
 
Although HIPAA sought to curb the sale of patient health information to 
data brokers, it did not intend to bar legitimate uses of health information that 
present no risk to patients. When a hospital, for example, notifies the public of the 
 
55 Id. (citing Best Principles for Health Privacy, Health Privacy Working Group (Jul. 1999)). 
56 Id. at 82,468. 
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d–6(b)(3). 
58 See Privacy Rule, supra note 16. 
59 See Security Rule, supra note 16. 
60 See Breach Notification Rule, supra note 16. 
61 See Enforcement Rule, supra note 16. 
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number of COVID-19 patients it has treated in the previous three months, that 
number is incapable of identifying any of the patients. The Privacy Rule sought to 
authorize such benign uses of medical information by introducing the concept of 
de-identified health information.  
 
The purpose of HIPAA’s definition of de-identified health information is 
to describe a category of health information that can be freely disseminated by 
healthcare organizations without restrictions, wholly unprotected by HIPAA’s 
comprehensive data protection requirements.62 Because this category of 
information is intended to be unprotected by HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, Security 
Rule or Breach Notification Rule, the de-identification process itself is 
responsible for safeguarding patient privacy. This can only be accomplished by 
removing all information that can be used to identify those patients. So long as 
the information cannot be used to identify any of the patients involved, it also 
cannot be used to harm those patients.  
  
Section 514(a) of the Privacy Rule defines “de-identified health 
information” as “[h]ealth information that does not identify an individual and 
with respect to which there is no reasonable basis to believe … can be used to 
identify an individual.”63 This definition is in harmony with HIPAA’s definition 
of individually identifiable information, which is “any information … that … 
[either]: (i) identifies the individual; or (ii) with respect to which there is a 
reasonable basis to believe … can be used to identify the individual.” 64   
 
The phrase “reasonable basis to believe” appears in both definitions. 
HIPAA’s implementation specifications for de-identification – stated in Sections 
514(b) and (c) of the Privacy Rule – give healthcare organizations procedures for 
adhering to Section 514(a)’s standard. Those procedures start with the removal of 
all direct identifiers. If a healthcare organization wants to replace those direct 
identifiers with identification codes – what Tanner called a “anonymous patient 
identification key” – then it must comply with the requirements of Section 514(c). 
After the direct identifiers have been removed or replaced with identification 
codes, the healthcare organization must comply with Section 514(b) to confirm 






62 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (“The requirements of [HIPAA’s Privacy Rule] do not apply to 
information that has been de-identified in accordance with the applicable requirements of § 
164.514 …”). 
63 Standard: de-identification of protected health information, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a). 
64 42 U.S.C §1320d–6 (emphasis added). 
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B. The Inherent Dangers of Identification Codes and HIPAA’s Safeguards 
Against Them 
 
Under HIPAA, de-identification starts with the removal of direct 
identifiers. In many instances, there is no need to use identification codes. If a 
hospital, for example, wants to release statistics about the number of COVID-19 
patients it has treated in the preceding three months, because this information is 
simple statistics, there is no need to replace patient identifiers with identification 
codes.  
 
There are circumstances, however, where using identification codes is 
called for. A researcher studying the comparative effectiveness of a particular 
drug may need to look at relevant information regarding each patient in the study. 
This patient-level medical data is also known as “microdata.” The healthcare 
organization could provide a de-identified version of this microdata in order to 
allow the researcher to conduct her study. If the study uncovers a surprising side 
effect of the drug, the researcher could alert the healthcare organization about that 
danger. The healthcare organization could then use the identification code to re-
identify the patient’s records and take appropriate steps to address the health risk 
to the patient. 
 
Identification codes are very susceptible to compromise.65 The entity that 
assigns the identification codes, for example, typically also possesses the ability 
to identify the patients represented by those codes. This could occur directly, by 
using the coding technology to reverse the code back into the patient’s identity. 
But even if there are safeguards against this direct misuse, a party with the ability 
to utilize the coding technology could use it to identify patients indirectly. The 
party could accomplish this, for example, by using the technology to create 
identification codes for all people within a certain location, or even for the entire 
US. It could then compare those codes to the identification codes provided by the 
healthcare organization to unlock the identities of all of the healthcare 
organization’s patients. 
 
Any compromise of the identification codes results in a compromise of the 
patients’ identities and the medical records associated with those codes.66 In light 
of the inherent risks of identification codes, HIPAA is very cautious about their 
 
65 See, e.g., Tanner, The Hidden Trade in Medical Data, supra note 2 (“… it turned out that a 
simple code could unlock the patients’ national ID numbers.”). 
66 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d) (“(i) Disclosure of a code or other means of record identification 
designed to enable coded or otherwise de-identified information to be re-identified constitutes 
disclosure of protected health information; and (ii) [i]f de-identified information is re-identified, a 
covered entity may use or disclose such re-identified information only as permitted or required by 
this subpart.”). 
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use with de-identified information. Section 514(c)67 places strict limitations on 
their utilization: 
A covered entity may assign a code or other means of record 
identification to allow information de-identified under this section to be 
re-identified by the covered entity, provided that: 
(1) Derivation. The code or other means of record identification is 
not derived from or related to information about the individual and 
is not otherwise capable of being translated so as to identify 
the individual; and 
(2) Security. The covered entity does not use or disclose the code 
or other means of record identification for any other purpose, and 
does not disclose the mechanism for re-identification. 
Section 514(c) places four requirements on the implementation of identification 
codes. Each requirement corresponds to a way in which identification codes could 
result in compromising patients’ identities: 
 
1. The identification code must be assigned by the healthcare organization.68 
This is because the ability to assign the code leads to the ability to directly 
or indirectly identify the patients represented by the code.  
 
2. The identification code must not be “derived from or related to 
information about the [patient], or “capable of being translated so as to 
identify the patient.” 69 If the code were capable of being translated to 
identify a patient, this could easily result in the identification of the 
patient. 
 
3. The healthcare organization cannot disclose the mechanism for re-
identification to any third party 70 because disclosing that mechanism 
enables third parties to identify the patients. This echoes Section 
502(d)(2)(i) of the Privacy Rule, which states that “[d]isclosure of a code 
or other means of record identification designed to enable coded or 
otherwise de-identified information to be re-identified constitutes 
disclosure of protected health information.”71 
 
 
67 Id. at § 164.514(c). 
68 Id. (“A covered entity may assign a code or other means of record identification …”). 
69 See id. § 164.514(c)(1) (“The code or other means of record identification is not derived from or 
related to information about the [patient] and is not otherwise capable of being translated so as to 
identify the [patient]; …”) (emphasis added). 
70 See id. at § 164.514(c)(2) (“The covered entity does not … disclose the mechanism for re-
identification.”) 
71 Id. at § 164.502(d). 
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4. The healthcare organization can only use the identification code to re-
identify its own de-identified health information.72 This is because, if a 
healthcare organization gave a third party the ability to re-identify its 
patients, it would also be giving that party the ability to re-identify the 
patients’ medical records.  
 
In light of the notorious secrecy healthcare organizations and their data 
broker customers maintain regarding their medical records transactions, it is 
impossible to assess whether they are complying with Section 514(c). Tanner’s 
exposé, however, raises a number of red flags. Recalling Tanner’s discussion of 
the data brokers’ software that replaces direct identifiers with identification codes, 
he says: 
[D]ata miners are able to match these files by getting pharmacies, insurers, 
testing labs, electronic health record systems, and other suppliers to all 
install the same de-identification software (for which they compensate the 
data suppliers). 
 
This software removes the personal details for each individual—such as 
name, address, telephone number, and Social Security number—but 
assigns that person the same anonymous patient identification key across 
all locations using that de-identification system. ‘If they install that de-ID 
engine at every source and it has the same algorithm, that means everyone 
with the same PHI (personal health information) will get the same IMS 
patient key,’ says Mark Degatano, who has advised IMS Health and 
worked at rival data miner Symphony Health.73 
Based on this passage, it appears that healthcare organizations, rather than 
assigning the identification codes to their own patients’ records, are allowing the 
software of the data brokers or the brokers’ vendors to assign the identifications 
codes – that may be violating Section 514(c)’s first control. 
 
It also appears that the healthcare organizations may be violating 
Section 514(c)’s fourth control. Rather than using their patients’ identification 
codes solely for the purpose of re-identifying their own de-identified information, 
Tanner’s passage suggests that healthcare organizations are using them to 
“sweeten the deal” for their data broker customers. The data broker customers 
want the identification codes so that they can build medical histories about each of 
the healthcare organizations’ patients and track those patients throughout their 
lives. The healthcare organizations sell that ability by allowing the broker (or its 




72 See id. at § 164.514(c)(2) (“The covered entity does not use or disclose the code or other means 
of record identification for any other purpose …”) (emphasis added). 
73 Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data, supra note 2, at 11. 
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The passage gives fewer indications regarding Section 514(c)’s second 
and third controls. Use of the term “patient identification key” suggests that the 
broker, or its agent who operates the “de-ID engine,” may be using cryptographic 
algorithms to create the identification codes. As HHS has made clear, however, 
the use of cryptographic algorithms to create identification codes does not comply 
with HIPAA if the implementation otherwise violates Section 514(c).  
 
In discussing a proposed use of a cryptographic hashing technique known 
as “Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code” (or HMAC), for example, HHS 
rejected implementations that allowed a data broker to track patients over time: 
“… it appears the key is shared with or provided by the recipient of the 
data in order for that recipient to be able to link information about the 
[patient] from multiple entities or over time. Since the HMAC allows 
identification of individuals by the recipient, disclosure of the HMAC 
violates the [Privacy] Rule.” 74 
 
The use of the cryptographic technology per se wasn’t the problem. If the 
implementation of the HMAC identification codes complied with 
Section 514(c)’s requirements, it would be permissible. The proposed 
implementation, however, was configured to allow the “recipient to be able to link 
information about [patients] from multiple [sources] over time.”75 This can only 
be accomplished either if the healthcare organization shares the cryptographic key 
with the recipient, or if the recipient (or its agent) provides the key for creating the 
HMAC identification codes. Either case violates Section 514(c) and results in 
giving the recipient the ability to identify the patients represented by those 
identification codes.  
 
Tanner’s work hints at another way identification codes can be 
compromised. The reason data brokers want the patients’ identification codes is to 
create comprehensive profiles or “dossiers” about those patients. “Data 
scientists,” however, are capable of “… marrying anonymized patient dossiers 
with named consumer profiles available elsewhere – with a surprising degree of 
accuracy.”76 This capability, in turn, lets the broker compromise the identification 
codes without even needing to compromise the cryptographic algorithm used to 
create them.  
 
In the Sweeny study, for example, researchers indicated that 87% of the 
U.S. population could be identified using only their gender, date of birth and zip 
 
74 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,233 
(Aug. 14, 2002) [hereinafter the 2002 Final Rule] (emphasis added). 
75 Id. 
76 Thielman, supra note 1.  
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code.77 If a data broker possessed identification codes for 200 million patients that 
are linked to their gender, date of birth and zip code, the broker would possess the 
ability to compromise 174 million of those identification codes. For those 174 
million identification codes, the broker’s ability to link those codes to the correct 
patient is 100%. Furthermore, the number of identification codes that join this 
“100% club” will inevitably increase with time as more and more medical 
information is added to the other 36 million codes.  
 
This issue exists even if no single data source contains all of the necessary 
indirect identifiers, for example, where a broker has one  dataset that only 
includes the patients’ gender and age and then purchases a second  dataset that 
has their zip codes. When a broker has the ability to use identification codes to 
link those two data sources, it also possesses the ability to use those codes to 
identify a vast majority of the patients represented by them by merging the 
patients’ indirect identifiers. 
 
Healthcare organizations that give data brokers enough indirectly-
identifying information to identify a patient – whether that’s in a single data file, 
or as a piece of the puzzle – appear to violate the spirit of Section 514(c)’s third 
control, if not the letter. By disclosing those indirect identifiers together with an 
identification code that the broker can use to link that patient’s other indirect 
identifiers, the healthcare organization is disclosing a “mechanism for re-
identification” that can be used to identify a substantial majority of its patients.78 
 
C. Removing Indirect Identifiers 
 
Removing direct identifiers is a first step in the process of de-
identification, but it is far from sufficient to create de-identified health 
information. As previously discussed, “removing only the direct identifiers” is 
inadequate because “the resulting information would often remain identifiable, 
and its dissemination could result in significant violations of privacy.”79 Thus, if a 
healthcare organization removes “only the direct identifiers,” the resulting 
information continues to be individually identifiable health information that must 
be protected in accordance with HIPAA’s Privacy, Security and Breach 
Notification Rules.80 
 
77 See Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify, supra note 35, at 2. 
78 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c)(2) (“The covered entity does not … disclose the mechanism for re-
identification.”) 
79 2000 Final Rule, supra note 44, at 82,708. 
80 One example of this kind of health information is a limited data set. Limited data sets are 
created by removing 16 of the patients. direct identifiers from their medical records. See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.514(e)(2) (“A limited data set is protected health information …”). Even though limited data 




Removing all of the potential indirect identifiers can be a daunting task. 
First, there are many pieces of information that could potentially be used to 
identify a patient. Sweeney and HHS discussed gender, date of birth, zip code, 
race and diagnoses, but medical records can include many other potential indirect 
identifiers, such as place of birth, ethnic origin, religion, languages spoken, 
profession, event dates (such as admission to a hospital, discharge, length of stay), 
number of children, living parents, education, and so on. Second, different 
combinations of indirect identifiers can be used to identify different types of 
people. Some individuals, for example, may be identifiable by combing their 
dates of birth, religion and education, while another group may be identifiable by 
criminal history, languages spoken, location of birth. This, in turn, leads to a third 
challenge – because individuals can be identified by combinations of indirect 
identifiers, it takes significantly more effort to address all of the potential 
combinations. Any of those combinations can be linked to or combined with 
external sources of information that can be used to identify the patients. As HHS 
noted: 
… the existence of external sources of records with matching data 
elements which can be used to link with the de-identified information and 
identify individuals (e.g., voter registration records or driver’s license 
records). The risk of disclosure increases as the number of variables 
common to both types of records increases, as the accuracy or resolution 
of the data increases, and as the number of external sources increases.”81 
   
Notwithstanding this analytical complexity, there are many situations 
where a disclosure is very unlikely to identify a patient. When, for example, a 
hospital wants to inform the public that “last month we treated fifteen COVID-19 
patients,” it is very unlikely that statement can be used to identify any of the 
hospital’s patients.  
  
In light of these two aspects, Section 514(b) of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule82 
gives healthcare organizations two options for confirming that a potential release 
of medical information is sufficiently devoid of information so that “there is no 
reasonable basis to believe [that it] can be used to identify [a patient].”83 
 
The first, stated in Section 514(b)(1),84 embraces the analytical approach, 
by allowing healthcare organizations to confirm that the information cannot be 
 
that must be protected in accordance with HIPAA; see id., because they contain indirect identifiers 
that can be used to identify patients. 
81 2000 Final Rule, supra note 44, at 82,709 (emphasis added). 
82 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b). 
83 Id. at § 164.514(a). 
84 Id. at § 164.514(b)(1). 
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used to identify their patients using recognized statistical and scientific methods. 
HHS’s model for this process is what Federal agencies use when they de-identify 
their records before distributing them to the public. 
 
The second, specified in Section 514(b)(2),85 helps healthcare 
organizations in more straightforward situations, such as if a hospital wants to 
make a public statement such as “Last month we treated 25 COVID-19 patients.” 
It does this by giving healthcare organizations an easy-to-follow checklist.  
 
1. Statistical Confirmation Method 
 
a. The Language of Section 514(b)(1) 
 
For health information to be “de-identified” in accordance with Section 
514(b)(1), a healthcare organization must remove all patient-identifying 
information until: 
A person with appropriate knowledge of and experience with generally 
accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for rendering 
information not individually identifiable: 
(i) Applying such principles and methods, determines that the risk 
is very small that the information could be used, alone or in 
combination with other reasonably available information, by an 
anticipated recipient to identify an individual who is a subject of 
the information; and 
(ii) Documents the methods and results of the analysis that justify 
such determination …86 
Section 514(b)(1), therefore, has substantive and procedural requirements. 
 
Substantively, the healthcare organization must remove enough 
information from a patient’s health record as to enable a qualified statistician to 
confirm, using “generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and 
methods,” that the resulting information cannot be used to identify the patient. 
The statistician’s assessment is an objective analysis based on “generally accepted 
statistical and scientific principles and methods.” This analysis must take into 
account the ways the output information can be combined with other available 
information to identify patients. If, for example, a patient record includes her 
gender, date of birth and zip code that could be correlated with publicly available 
voting records, the statistician must assess the likelihood that the patient could be 
identified if her medical records and voting records were combined.  
 
 
85 Id. at § 164.514(b)(2). 
86 Id. at § 164.514(b)(1). 
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Procedurally, the qualified expert must document the statistical and 
scientific methods she used, her results, and the analysis she used to justify her 
results.  
 
This two-step process mirrors how federal agencies confirm they have 
removed all identifying information before they disseminate reports or data to the 
public. To aid healthcare organizations in following the government’s approach, 
HHS identified two key documents used by federal agencies.87 The first is the 
STATISTICAL POLICY WORKING PAPER 2288 (hereinafter referred to as WORKING 
PAPER 22) that describes the “generally accepted statistical and scientific 
principles and methods for rendering information not individually identifiable” 
used by federal agencies and described in clause (i) of Section 514(b)(1). With 
respect to the requirements of clause (ii), HHS identified the CHECKLIST ON 
DISCLOSURE POTENTIAL OF PROPOSED DATA RELEASES89 (hereinafter referred to 
as the CHECKLIST), which describes the documentation federal agencies use to 
memorialize that they utilized the appropriate statistical methods before releasing 
it. 
 
b. Very Small Risk of Identification 
 
Under Section 514(b)(1), health information can be labeled “de-identified” 
only if there is a “very small” risk that it could be used to identify any of the 
patients represented by such information.90 “Very small” is synonymous with 
“very low probability”91 that is defined and measured by “generally accepted 
statistical and scientific principles and methods” described in WORKING 
PAPER 22.92 It is not something that can be selected; nor is it a “judgement call” 
incapable of bona fide measurement in controlled settings. Rather, it is a threshold 
based on objectively established statistical or scientific principles for protecting 
 
87 See 2000 Final Rule, supra note 44, at 82,708 (discussing consultation with the Confidentiality 
and Data Access Committee, Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology, Office of 
Management and Budget and objectives for selection of guidance documentation for confirming 
health information is de-identified). 
88 SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISCLOSURE LIMITATION METHODOLOGY, FEDERAL COMMITTEE ON 
STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY, Report on Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology, (Office of 
Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Working Paper No. 22, 1994) [hereinafter 
Working Paper 22]. 
89 CHECKLIST ON DISCLOSURE POTENTIAL OF PROPOSED DATA RELEASES, Interagency 
Confidentiality and Data Access Committee, Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology, 
Statistical Policy Office, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget (July 
1999) [hereinafter CHECKLIST], https://nces.ed.gov/FCSM/doc/checklist_799.doc. 
90 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added). 
91 2000 Final Rule, supra note 44, at 82,709 (“In this context, we do not view the difference 
between a very low probability and a very small risk to be substantive.”). 
92 Id. 
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the confidentiality of patients’ identities against known risks. Because those risks 
will “change over time to keep up with technology and the current availability of 
public information from other sources,”93 what counts as “very small” in one 
decade will be different from what constitutes “very small” in the next.  
 
HHS’s definition of de-identification is premised on the idea that 
information qualifying as “de-identified information” is no longer covered by 
HIPAA and can be disclosed to the public without any restrictions.94 HHS’s 
selection of WORKING PAPER 22 reflects this view because its methods are used 
by “federal agencies that routinely de-identify and anonymize information for 
public release.”95 As noted by WORKING PAPER 22, its techniques protect privacy 
solely by removing identifiable information until the outputs can safely be 
released to the public “without restrictions on use or other conditions.”96  
 
The level of certainty, therefore, is measured by the understanding that 
being “wrong” will violate the law and result in a data breach. For example, under 
42 U.S.C. §1306(a), it is illegal under most circumstances to release any portion 
of a tax return filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).97 Thus, when the 
IRS releases statistical information based on tax returns it has collected, it must 
remove all information that would violate Section 1306(a). If the IRS’s process 
for “de-identifying” a tax return resulted in releasing identifiable information to 
the public, that would be a violation of the law. Before releasing “de-identified” 
tax return information, therefore, the IRS must have a very high level of 
confidence that none of the information disclosed will result in a violation of 
Section 1306(a). Similarly, to cryptography’s concept of “infeasibility,” the risk 
does not need to be zero. But it must be small enough, based on known 
vulnerabilities, to provide a very high level of confidence based on generally 
accepted statistical principles and methods. 98 
 
93 Id. 
94 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (“The requirements of [HIPAA’s Privacy Rule] do not apply to 
information that has been de-identified in accordance with the applicable requirements of § 
164.514 …”). 
95 2000 Final Rule, supra note 44, at 82,709. 
96 Working Paper 22, supra note 88, at 3 (“The statistical disclosure limitation techniques 
described in this paper are applied whenever confidentiality is required and data or estimates are to 
be publicly available.”). 
97 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (“No disclosure of any return or portion of a return (including 
information returns and other written statements) filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
… shall be made except as the head of the applicable agency may by regulations prescribe and 
except as otherwise provided by Federal law. Any person who shall violate any provision of this 
section shall be deemed guilty of a felony …”). 
98 For a discussion of the measure of “infeasibility” for approved cryptographic hash algorithms, 
see discussion of “Hash Function Properties” in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND 




This overlaps with HIPAA’s obligations under its Breach Notification 
Rule. Under the Rule, a “breach” is defined as “the acquisition, access, use, or 
disclosure of [identifiable] health information in a manner not permitted under 
[the Privacy Rule] which compromises the security or privacy of [such 
identifiable] health information.”99 Under the Breach Notification Rule, this is 
“presumed to be a breach unless the [healthcare organization] demonstrates that 
there is a low probability that the [identifiable] health information has been 
compromised based on a risk assessment” of four factors.100 The first of those 
factors is the “nature and extent” of the information involved. 101 If the healthcare 
organization has removed patient identifiers, it must consider the remaining 
identifiers and “the likelihood of re-identification.”102 If, for example, those 
medical records contain indirect identifiers that could not be safely released to the 
public, this is individually identifiable patient information and the healthcare 
organization must perform the required risk assessment and/or warn patients that 
their information has been released to an unauthorized party.  
 
HHS’s own de-identification practices offer a useful illustration. In the 
late 2000’s, HHS’s Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information 
Technology (hereinafter referred to as ONC) commissioned a research team to 
attempt to re-identify the health records of approximately 15,000 individuals that 
had the 18 identifiers removed in accordance with Section 514(b)(2), the so-called 
“safe harbor” method of de-identification. The research team compared those 
records with consumer data provided by a national data broker and was able to re-
 
USING APPROVED HASH ALGORITHMS, Computer Security Division, Information Technology 
Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology (Aug. 2012) [hereinafter NIST SP 
800-107], 6-9. Cryptographic algorithms protect the confidentiality of personal information by 
rendering it indecipherable unless you have the “key” to unlock it. All deterministic algorithms, 
however, can be compromised. If an attacker has an infinite amount of time and computing power, 
she could break the algorithm simply by guessing new passwords until she unlocks the personal 
information. This inherent vulnerability is known as a “brute force attack” or “exhaustive key 
search,” and it is a fundamental risk that all cryptographic algorithms are measured against. This 
risk is objectively measured as a function of (i) the number of mathematical operations it takes to 
make each guess, multiplied by (ii) the number of mathematical operations that current computers 
are capable of processing in a given time period. Based on these metrics, cryptographers have 
defined “infeasibility” – their version of “very small” or “very low probability” in terms of the 
physical limits on what an attacker could utilize based on current technologies. To be able to 
compromise an algorithm based on a brute force attack, it should take many years of guesses 
before the attack would be successful. Converted into probabilities, the chance that an attacker 
succeeds on her first “lucky guess” is measured in the range of less than one-in-a-trillion trillion 
trillion. This probability is not zero. Rather, it is a very low probability that is sufficiently robustly 
that it accomplishes the intended goal against known vulnerabilities. 
99 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.402. 
100 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (emphasis added). 
101 Id. (emphasis added). 
102 Id. (emphasis added). 
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identify two of approximately 15,000 individuals, or 0.013% of the population.103 
As low as this percentage is, it has not been recognized as an “acceptable error 
rate” when it comes to HHS’s own de-identified health information. A release of 
the records of the two patients’ medical records would constitute a data breach 
because their entities have been compromised. 
 
Accordingly, when HHS’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(hereinafter referred to as CMS) releases de-identified medical claims data for its 
beneficiaries in its “public use files,” CMS utilizes the full gamut of disclosure 
limitation techniques described in WORKING PAPER 22,104 including: 
• Drastically reducing the number of variables in a claim record; 
• Suppressing rare diagnosis and procedure codes; 
• Substituting claims from donor beneficiaries using an actual beneficiary as 
the seed, or pattern, for the synthetic beneficiaries; donor claims were 
found using a key variable from the seed and donor claims; 
• Restricting the amount of information coming from any one donor and 
always using multiple donors; a minimum of three donors contributing to 
each single synthetic beneficiary claim set; 
• Synthesizing secondary variable sets within the donated claims 
conditioned on key variables, for added disclosure protection; 
• Perturbing various claim dates by altering the start date of the claim set 
used as the seed and proportionally altering the number of days between 
claims; 
• Coarsening expenditure variables, so that larger values were coarsened 
into larger bins, and truncating both tails of the distribution (top and 
bottom); 
• Synthesizing provider information (institution and physician) by drawing 
from empirical distribution conditioned on the synthesized geography of 
the beneficiary; 
• Suppressing rare combinations of institution and physician codes from the 
data used to create synthetic claims. 105  
 
In order for information to be considered de-identified under 
Section 514(b)(1), therefore, the application of bona fide statistical and scientific 
methods must be able to objectively demonstrate that there is a very low 
probability that the resulting information can be used to identify patients by any 
 
103 See Deborah Lafky, The Safe Harbor Method of De-Identification: An Empirical Test, ONC 
PRESENTATION (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter The Safe Harbor Method: An Empirical Test], 
http://www.ehcca.com/presentations. 
104 See USER MANUAL CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES (CMS) LINKABLE 2008-
2010 MEDICARE DATA ENTREPRENEURS’ SYNTHETIC PUBLIC USE FILES (DE-SYNPUF) (2013), 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Downloadable-Public-Use-
Files/SynPUFs/Downloads/SynPUF_DUG.pdf. 
105 Id. at 14-15. 
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party who is not authorized to obtain identifiable patient information under 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule. Unless that can be demonstrated, the information in 
question does not satisfy Section 514(b)(1)’s standard for de-identification. 
 
c. Anticipated Recipients 
 
Although HHS defines de-identified information as information that can 
be safely disclosed to the public free of all restrictions in a manner contemplated 
by Section 502(d)(2) of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule,106 HIPAA does not require every 
instance of de-identified information to be released to the public. Healthcare 
organizations can release de-identified information to specific entities rather than 
the public. Section 514(b)(1) calls any entity anticipated to receive that medical 
information an “anticipated recipient.”  
 
The reference to “anticipated recipient” reflects important practical 
differences between the ways in which de-identified medical information is 
released to the public versus private parties. Healthcare organizations often 
release information to the public on their own initiative. A hospital’s report 
regarding its COVID-19 procedures is an example of such a release, and its 
motivation is to provide the public with information about an important public 
health issue.  
 
In contrast to public reports, private data releases are often initiated by the 
recipient and are intended to benefit the recipient, not the public, the healthcare 
organization, or any of its patients. A data broker or researcher, for example, may 
approach a healthcare organization and offer to pay substantial premiums for 
granular patient medical records that go far beyond what the healthcare 
organization would release on its own initiative. A data broker, for example, may 
be looking for the full medical records – including specific diagnoses, 
medications and even the doctors’ notes – about tens of thousands of patients with 
an eye to analyzing that data or combining it with other data about those patients. 
 
Because these requests are often unique, Section 514(b)(1) requires the 
statistician’s analysis to address the unique aspects of information the data broker 
– the anticipated recipient – is requesting. The analysis must also take into 
consideration what additional information the data broker may have at its disposal 
that could be used to identify any of the patients. If, for example, the broker is a 
consumer reporting agency with access to significant volumes of detailed personal 
information about the patients whose medical records are being provided, the 
analysis must take that into account when applying the appropriate techniques 
from WORKING PAPER 22. The statistician, for example, may conclude that the 
data needs to be fictionalized to a greater extent to ensure that the medical records 
 
106 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (“The requirements of [HIPAA’s Privacy Rule] do not apply to 
information that has been de-identified in accordance with the applicable requirements of § 
164.514 …”). 
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being provided cannot be linked or correlated with any personal information the 
broker can access about those same patients.  
 
2. The (Semi-) Safe Harbor Method 
 
a. Redacting Identifiers in Accordance with Section 514(b)(2)(i) 
 
The requirements of Section 514(b)(1) allow healthcare organizations to 
use accepted statistical methods to ensure that the health information they are 
releasing cannot be used to identify their patients; or, more precisely, to ensure 
that “there is no reasonable basis to believe [that the information] can be used to 
identify [their patients].” Those requirements, however, are extraordinarily 
burdensome if a hospital simply wants to confirm the number of COVID-19 
patients it treated the previous month. For those cases, Section 514(b)(2) of the 
Privacy Rule107 gives healthcare organizations a simpler alternative.  
 
If a hospital wants to confirm whether a simple statement is de-identified – 
such as “Last month we treated 15 COVID-19 patients” – Section 514(b)(2) 
allows the hospital to presumptively confirm that this statement is de-identified by 
confirming that the following eighteen identifiers have been removed for the 
patient, as well as her relatives, employers and household members:108 
(A)  names; 
(B)  all geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street 
address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent 
geocodes, except for the initial three digits of a zip code if, according 
to the current publicly available data from the Bureau of the Census: 
(1)  the geographic unit formed by combining all zip codes with the 
same three initial digits contains more than 20,000 people; and 
(2)  the initial three digits of a zip code for all such geographic 
units containing 20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000. 
(C)  all elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an 
individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date 
of death; and all ages over 89 and all elements of dates (including 
year) indicative of such age, except that such ages and elements may 
be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older; 
(D)  telephone numbers; 
(E)  fax numbers; 
(F)  electronic mail addresses; 
(G)  social security numbers; 
(H)  medical record numbers; 
(I)  health plan beneficiary numbers; 
(J)  account numbers; 
 
107 Id. at § 164.514(b)(2). 
108 Id. at §164.514(b)(2)(i). 
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(K)  certificate/license numbers; 
(L)  vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate 
numbers; 
(M)  device identifiers and serial numbers; 
(N)  web Universal Resource Locators (URLs); 
(O)  Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers; 
(P)  biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints; 
(Q)  full face photographic images and any comparable images; and 
(R)  any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, except 
as permitted by [Section 514(c)] […]. 
Given Section 514(b)(2)’s “paint-by-numbers” approach, it is frequently referred 
to as the “safe harbor” method of de-identification.  
 
The use of the term “safe harbor” is misleading. Although the 18 
identifiers offer a good rule-of-thumb for a wide range of routine disclosures, it is 
still possible for identifying information to slip through the cracks. If the hospital 
described above, for example, wanted to raise awareness about the infectiousness 
of COVID-19 by informing the public that even young, healthy athletes can 
contract it, it may be tempted to issue the following announcement: 
“Even young, healthy athletes can get COVID-19! Just last week we 
treated the most famous seven-foot baller who has three championship 
rings to his name! If he can get it, so can you!” 
 
This statement does not include any identifiers listed in 
Section 514(b)(2)(i). Nevertheless, the statement likely could be used to identify 
the patient either on its own, or in combination with other information.109 
Members of the public, for example, could look up which athletes are seven feet 
tall, and infer that the hospital is referring to a basketball player. They could then 
review sports websites to find out which seven-footers have won three 
championships and see what teams play in the vicinity of the hospital. 
 
This situation is easy to detect in isolated statements. But it is often more 
difficult to detect if the healthcare organization intends to release individual 
medical records for thousands of individuals. Some of the more famous breaches 
of identifiable patient information have occurred from the release of medical 
records that complied with the redaction requirements of Section 514(b)(2)(i).  
 
A famous example occurred when Professor Sweeney identified 
Massachusetts Governor, William Weld, using hospital records that had been 
redacted in accordance with Section 514(b)(2)(i).110 This was followed by a wave 
 
109 Id. at §164.514(b)(2)(ii) (“The [healthcare organization] does not have actual knowledge that 
the information could be used alone or in combination with other information to identify an 
individual who is a subject of the information.”). 
110 Latanya Sweeney, Weaving Technology and Policy Together to Maintain Confidentiality, 25 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 99 (1997). 
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of studies that produced similar results. In a 2015 study, for example, researchers 
identified patients in purportedly de-identified hospital records released by the 
State of Washington111 that described incidents of venereal diseases, drug 
dependency, alcohol use, tobacco use.112 Similar studies successfully identified 
patients from redacted hospital data from California, Maine and Vermont.113 
 
Section 514(b)(2)(i)-redaction is particularly vulnerable where a patient’s 
longitudinal records are being assembled. In the ONC study described above, the 
research team was able to identify approximately 0.013% of the population.114 
When researchers have a chance to compare a patient’s medical records over a 
period of time, the percentages can rise dramatically. A 2013 study examined this 
phenomenon through evaluating the identification risks associated with a database 
of biometric information that had been redacted in accordance with 
Section 514(b)(2)(i).115 The study found that the ability to identify patients 
represented in the database increased dramatically when researchers could 
compare it to the patient’s longitudinal health information.116 When researchers 
could utilize the known results for four consecutive PCV panels, for example, 
they had 19.5% chance of uniquely identifying a patient in the redacted 
biomedical database.117 When researchers had access to six consecutive panels, 
the rate jumped to 89%.118  
 
For these reasons, redacting medical records in accordance with 
Section 514(b)(2)(i) is not an effective means for confirming that “there is no 
reasonable basis to believe [that it] can be used to identify [a patient]” when the 
healthcare organization has “actual knowledge that the information could be used 
alone or in combination with other information to identify an individual who is a 
 
111 Latanya Sweeney, Only You, Your Doctor, and Many Others May Know, TECH. SCI. (Sept. 29, 
2015), https://techscience.org/a/2015092903/.  
112 Id. 
113 See, e.g., Latanya Sweeney et al., Re-identification Risks in HIPAA Safe Harbor Data: A study 
of data from one environmental health study, TECH. SCI. (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://techscience.org/a/2017082801/ (noting data from California); Ji Su Yoo et al., Risks to 
Patient Privacy: A Re-identification of Patients in Maine and Vermont Statewide Hospital Data, 
TECH. SCI. (Oct. 8, 2018), https://techscience.org/a/2018100901/ (noting data from Maine and 
Vermont). 
114 See Lafky, supra note 103, at 19. 
115 See Ravi V. Atreya et al., Reducing patient re-identification risk for laboratory results within 
research datasets, 20 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 95 (2013), 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22822040/. 




subject of the information.”119 Thus, even if all 18 of the required identifiers have 
been removed, the data is not de-identified if the healthcare organization knows 
that the information identifies one or more individuals. 
 
b. Healthcare Organizations’ Duty to Be Informed About Known Risks to 
their Patients’ Confidentiality under HIPAA’s Security Rule 
 
Section 514(b)(2)(ii)’s reference to the phrase “actual knowledge” can be 
confusing. “Actual knowledge” is a legal term that describes the mental state of 
an individual or an organization. For an individual, the phrase refers to the 
contents of her mind – what specific facts or information was she consciously 
aware of? Given the diversity of human experience, those contents can vary from 
person to person. Accordingly, someone’s “actual knowledge” cannot be 
presumed. There are many situations where a person may be ignorant of facts that 
are well-known to others. The legal term “actual knowledge” is focused on a 
person’s specific state of mind, not what that person should have known, 
regardless of how commonly known or easy to learn the facts in question are.120 
 
Assessing an organization’s actual knowledge is trickier still. 
Organizations are made up of many individuals, often numbering in the hundreds, 
thousands or tens of thousands. How does one assess what a company of 10,000 
employees “actually knows?” Does the company “know” a fact if a single 
employee is aware of that fact? Or if a majority of employees do? Or if certain 
categories of employees know, such as corporate officers or employees with 
specific job responsibilities?  
 
HIPAA’s Security Rule and Breach Notification Rules answer some of 
these questions by requiring healthcare organizations to know about potential 
risks and harms to patient confidentiality. Each is particularly focused on uses or 
disclosures of patient information that are not permitted under HIPAA’s Privacy 
Rule. Healthcare organizations cannot choose to be ignorant about those risks and 
harms.  
 
HIPAA’s Security Rule, for example, requires healthcare organizations to 
protect against “any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures” of their patient 
information that would not be permitted by the Privacy Rule.121 This includes 
protecting against any “reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security 
 
119 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(ii). 
120 See, e.g., Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 140 S. Ct. 768, 776 (2020) (“Legal 
dictionaries give ‘actual knowledge’ the same meaning: ‘[r]eal knowledge as distinguished from 
presumed knowledge or knowledge imputed to one.’; BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 24 (3d ed. 
1969); accord, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (11th ed. 2019) (defining ‘actual knowledge’ as 
‘[d]irect and clear knowledge, as distinguished from constructive knowledge’). The qualifier 
‘actual’ creates that distinction.”). 
121 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(3). 
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[...] of such information.”122 In furtherance of this obligation, healthcare 
organizations must conduct “an accurate and thorough assessment of the 
potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality” of the health information 
they hold.123 Healthcare organizations, therefore, are required to inform 
themselves thoroughly about potential risks and vulnerabilities to the 
confidentiality of their patients’ information. 
 
To aid healthcare organizations in conducting such risk assessments, HHS 
commends special publications from the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (hereinafter referred to as NIST), 124 such as NIST Special Publication 
800-30 (2002).125 Documenting all potential human, environmental and natural 
threats is a significant undertaking. NIST SP 800-30 (2002) aids organizations in 
creating an inventory by listing examples of such threats ranging from corporate 
espionage and criminal hacking, on one hand, to poorly trained employees or 
agents, on the other.126 NIST’s guidance regarding compromises of de-identified 
information is located in NIST Interagency Report 8053 (hereinafter referred to as 
NIST IR 8053).127 NIST IR 8053 identifies a number of such risks that could 
result in the identification of individuals, such as patients, which it calls “re-
identification attacks.”128 As with any other human threat, the motivations for re-
 
122 Id. at § 164.306(a)(2). 
123 Id. at § 164.308(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
124 See, e.g., HIPAA Security Rule: Health Insurance Reform: Security Standard, 68 Fed. Reg. 
8,334, 8,346 (Feb. 20, 2003) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 162, 164), 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Regulations-and-
Policies/QuarterlyProviderUpdates/downloads/cms0049f.pdf; OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, GUIDANCE 
ON RISK ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE HIPAA SECURITY RULE 1, 3–4 (2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/rafinalguidan
cepdf.pdf; DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HIPAA SECURITY SERIES: BASICS OF RISK 
ANALYSIS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 3–5, (2005, rev. 2007), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/riskassessme
nt.pdf. 
125 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDE FOR 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS, NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-30 (2002) (superseded by 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, GUIDE FOR CONDUCTING RISK 
ASSESSMENTS, NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-30 REVISION 1 (2012)), 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-30.pdf. 
126 Id. at 14 (listing categories of threats, motivations and threat actions). 
127 See, e.g., Simson L. Garfinkel, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, DE-
IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION, NIST INTERNAL REPORT 8053 (2015), 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST.IR.8053.pdf. 
128 Id. at 9. 
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identification attacks vary. NIST IR 8053129 lists six threat motivations that 
overlap with those described in NIST SP 800-30.130 
 
The ongoing risk assessments required by the Security Rule have 
important implications for the level of “actual knowledge” that healthcare 
organizations are required to possess. Their “actual knowledge” must be informed 
by the “accurate and thorough assessment[s] of the potential risks and 
vulnerabilities” they must conduct131 in order to protect the health information in 
their possession from “any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards[…].”132 
These assessments should document the types of risks, threats and hazards 
described by NIST in its various publications, including NIST SP 800-30 and 
NIST IR 8053. The Security Rule does not permit healthcare organizations to 
simply “plead ignorance” or be “willfully blind” about well understood risks to 
the confidentiality of their patients’ information. They cannot simply choose to be 
ignorant of the many potential vulnerabilities of identification codes or of the 
ways longitudinal health records can be compromised even if they are redacted in 
accordance with Section 514(b)(2)(i). 
 
c. Healthcare Organizations’ Duty to Be Informed under the Breach 
Notification Rule 
 
HIPAA’s Breach Notification Rule also requires healthcare organizations 
be informed about potentially harmful disclosures of their patients’ health 
information. Under the Breach Notification Rule, a “breach” is defined as “the 
acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of [identifiable] health information in a 
manner not permitted under [the Privacy Rule] which compromises the security or 
privacy of [such identifiable] health information.”133 Section 402 of the Breach 
Notification Rule goes on to say that the “acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of 
[identifiable] health information in a manner not permitted under [the Privacy 
Rule] is presumed to be a breach unless the [healthcare organization] 
demonstrates that there is a low probability that the [identifiable] health 
information has been compromised based on a risk assessment of four factors.” 134 
The first of those factors is assessing the “nature and extent of the [identifiable] 
 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 10 (discussing a range of threats, including entities attempting to harm the individuals re-
identified, financial gain). 
131 Id. at § 164.308(a)(1). 
132 Id. at § 164.306(a)(2). 
133 Id. at § 164.402(1). 
134 Id. at § 164.402(2). 
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health information involved, including the types of identifiers and the likelihood 
of reidentification.”135  
 
Even if the health information has had identifiers removed, any disclosure 
of that information is a breach unless the covered entity can demonstrate that 
either (i) there is a low probability that such health information is re-identifiable; 
or (ii) if it is re-identifiable, that such health information has only been provided 
to entities otherwise entitled to receive it under the Privacy Rule. Unless the 
healthcare organization can demonstrate that that release presents a low 
probability of re-identification by the recipient, patients must be warned that their 
information has been released to an unauthorized party so that they can protect 
themselves from the potentially harmful impact.136 
 
As with the Security Rule, the Breach Notification Rule requires 
healthcare organizations to be knowledgeable about relevant risks when health 
information is released or used in ways that would violate the Privacy Rule. 
Under Section 402, it is presumed that any disclosure of health information that 
would not be permitted by the Privacy Rule is a “breach” – even for health 
information that has had identifiers removed – unless the covered entity (or 
business associate) can demonstrate that there is a low probability of 
compromise.137 That documented demonstration must include reviewing the 
identifiers that have been removed from the health information and assessing the 
likelihood that such information – even with the removed identifiers – can 
nevertheless be identified.138 The Breach Notification Rule, therefore, requires 
that healthcare organizations possess this level of “actual knowledge” when they 
release health information for purposes that would otherwise violate HIPAA’s 
Privacy Rule. 
 
D. When De-Identified Information is Unsuitable for a Research Study 
 
Not every research study can be conducted using de-identified patient 
information. If a study protocol requires analyzing patients’ gender, dates of birth 
and zip codes, for example, Sweeney’s study indicates that approximately 87% of 
those patients will be identifiable. If the study requires analyzing 10,000 patients, 




135 Id. at § 164.402(2)(i) (emphasis added). 
136 See, e.g., id. § 164.404(a) (“A covered entity shall, following the discovery of a breach of 
unsecured protected health information, notify each individual whose unsecured protected health 
information has been, or is reasonably believed by the covered entity to have been, accessed, 




This problem is well-understood by federal agencies. As noted in WORKING 
PAPER 22, “[a]ll disclosure limitation methods result in some loss of information, 
and sometimes the publicly available data may not be adequate for certain 
statistical studies.”139 As further noted by the Confidentiality and Data Access 
Committee (hereinafter referred to as CDAC), “[f]requently, the results of the 
Checklist or other considerations, will mean that a file cannot be released for 
public use, yet there is an acute need in the research community for detailed 
data.”140 
 
In these situations, the solution is not for the researcher or agency to 
“stretch” the definition of de-identification. If the information can be used to 
identify individuals, it is identifiable information regardless of the interests or 
motivations of the researchers or the agency’s desires to release that identifiable 
information. 
 
Instead, the answer is to acknowledge the identifiability of the information 
in question and to impose restrictions on how the researcher can access that 
information in accordance with applicable law. CDAC refers to these restrictions 
as “Restricted Access” arrangements.141  
 
Broadly speaking there are two forms of “Restricted Access.” CDAC calls 
the first “Licensing,” in which a “researcher must sign an agreement with the 
agency which permits the installation of the restricted data on their computer in 
return for meeting the agency’s conditions relating to maintaining confidentiality 
of the data.”142 The contract a researcher must sign includes the following types of 
provisions: 
• Demonstration of a need for detailed data; 
• Designation of those who have access;  
• Statement of legal provision;  
• Data security and enforcement/provision for inspection;  
• Restrictions on use (prohibition against linking with other files);  
• Restrictions on release of research results/adherence to agency policies; 
and 
• Return/Destruction of data provided.143 
 
 
139 Working Paper 22, supra note 88, at 6. 
140 Alvan Zarate et al., Paper presented at the FCSM Statistical Methodology Seminar: Integrating 
Federal Statistical Information and Processes, at 5 (Nov. 8-9, 2000), 
https://nces.ed.gov/FCSM/pdf/CDAC_paper2000.pdf. 
141 Id. at 5. 
142 Id. at 6. 
143 Id. 
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The second form of “Restricted Access” supplements “Licensing” by 
limiting the physical access to identifiable information to a “Research Data 
Center,” where the data is housed in a monitored environment that restricts the 
researcher’s access in various ways, such as: 
• Review of research protocol;  
• Formal agreement covering work to be done, data used, and types of 
output;  
• In-house files without identifiers;  
• Limitations on types of analysis;  
• No outside (linkable) data brought in by researcher;  
• Dedicated computers;  
• Review of data outputs;  
• Inspection of material removed from site; and 
• Physical presence of agency staff.144 
 
HIPAA follows this general framework. When a research study cannot be 
effectively conducted with de-identified health information, the answer is not to 
stretch the definition of “de-identified.” Instead, the answer is to acknowledge the 
identifiability of the information in question and to impose restrictions on how the 
researcher can access that information in light of the risks to patient privacy. 
 
In the hypothetical study described above, for example, the research 
protocol required access to patients’ gender, dates of birth and zip codes for 
approximately 10,000 patients. As per Sweeney’s study, this would result in 
giving researchers access to identifiable information that can be used to identify 
approximately 8,700 of those patients. Consequently, the researchers need access 
to identifiable patient information that must be protected as such. 
 
In these cases, it may be possible for researchers to use what HIPAA calls 
a “limited dataset.” Under HIPAA a limited  dataset is created by removing all of 
the following sixteen identifiers about the patients, their relatives, household 
members and employers: 
(i)  Names; 
(ii)  Postal address information, other than town or city, state, and zip 
code; 
(iii) Telephone numbers; 
(iv)  Fax numbers; 
(v)  Electronic mail addresses; 
(vi) Social security numbers; 
(vii) Medical record numbers; 
(viii) Health plan beneficiary numbers; 
(ix)  Account numbers; 




(xi)  Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate 
numbers; 
(xii) Device identifiers and serial numbers; 
(xiii) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs); 
(xiv) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers; 
(xv) Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints; and 
(xvi) Full face photographic images and any comparable images.145 
 
There is a significant overlap between the identifiers removed for limited  
datasets and those removed under Section 514(b)(2)(i) under the “safe harbor” 
method of de-identification. However, limited  datasets can include a patient’s 
date of birth, whereas Section 514(b)(2)(i) requires that the healthcare 
organization only list the patient’s year of birth.146 Furthermore, 
Section 514(b)(2)(i) requires that all specific dates be removed from de-identified 
health information, which often makes it impossible to conduct studies looking at 
impacts over shorter time periods. Limited  datasets, on the other hand, can 
include the full dates. 
 
Because limited  datasets can be used to identify patients, they are 
individually identifiable health information protected by HIPAA.147 But HIPAA 
allows limited  datasets to be used for research, public health and health care 
operations purposes.148 They can also be disclosed to a researcher provided that 
the researcher enters into a “data use agreement” that conforms to the 
requirements of Section 514(e)(4)(ii).149 This resembles CDAC’s “Licensing” 
approach to “Restricted Access” by requiring researchers to enter into a “data use 
agreement” with a number of patient privacy protections. Researchers, for 
example, are required to report any unauthorized use or disclosure of the limited  
dataset.150 Researchers also are not permitted to attempt to identify or contact any 
of the patients.151 If the healthcare organization becomes aware of violations by 
the researcher, the healthcare organization must take steps to cure the violation. If 
 
145 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2)(i)-(xvi). 
146 See id. at § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (“The following identifiers of the individual … are removed: … 
All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual, including birth date, 
admission date, discharge date, date of death …”). 
147 See id. at § 164.514(e)(2) (“A limited data set is protected health information …”) (emphasis 
added). 
148 See id. at § 164.514(e)(3)(i). 
149 See id. at § 164.514(e)(4)(ii). 
150 Id. at § 164.514(e)(4)(ii)(C)(3). 
151 Id. at § 164.514(e)(4)(ii)(C)(5). 
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those steps are unsuccessful, the healthcare organization must terminate the 
relationship and report the matter to HHS.152 
 
In situations where limited  datasets are insufficient for the research in 
question, HIPAA provides additional pathways for healthcare organizations to 
make their identifiable patient information available. One is under Section 508 of 
the Privacy Rule that authorizes healthcare organizations and researchers to use 
health information for research purposes pursuant to a patient authorization.153 
This is a common pathway in clinical research involving human subjects that 
would be used to test a drug or medical device. Such research is often conducted 
in accordance with the FDA’s “Common Rule,” which governs how federally 
funded clinical research is conducted, and is the de facto standard for clinical 
research in the United States that involves human subjects.154 In such research, 
“valid authorizations” are often obtained at the same time that a patient executes 
the “informed consent” required under the Common Rule. 
 
When the research requires the health information of a very large number 
of patients and obtaining valid authorizations is not feasible, Section 512(i) of the 
Privacy Rule authorizes healthcare organizations to conduct research under the 
supervision of an Institutional Review Board (also called an IRB) or a Privacy 
Board. These IRBs or Privacy Boards provide independent oversight over the 
research activity in question, including the researcher’s data management 
practices.155  
 
HHS’s CMS utilizes three of these approaches for releases of its Medicare 
claims information. CMS releases properly de-identified health information in its 
“Public Use Files.” If a researcher has a bona fide need for identifiable patient 
information for her research question, CMS gives researchers two options. One is 
to obtain access to CMS’s limited  dataset files that it has prepared in accordance 
with Section 514(e)(2).156 In situations where the research requires the fully-
identifiable patient information, the researcher can request CMS’s “Research 
Identifiable Files” (or RIFs). In conformance with Section 512(i) of the Privacy 
Rule, access to RIFs is “reviewed by CMS’s Privacy Board to ensure that the 
 
152 Id. at § 164.514(e)(4)(iii). 
153 Id. at § 164.508(a)(1). 
154 The “Common Rule” is a familiar name for subpart A of Federal Policy for the Protection of 
Human Subjects, codified at 45 C.F.R. part 46. The purpose of the Common Rule is to protect 
human research subject who have agreed to participate in government funded research. The main 
elements of the Common Rule are requirements for researchers obtaining and documenting 
informed consent, and compliance requirements for research stakeholders, including research 
institutions and Institutional Review Boards. 
155 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i). 
156 See, e.g., id. 
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beneficiaries’ privacy is protected and only the minimum data necessary is 
requested and justified.”157 
 
 
IV. ANATOMY OF A HACK: 
METHODS FOR LABELING IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION “DE-IDENTIFIED” 
 
A. Overview of Permissive “De-Identification Guidelines” 
 
HIPAA’s requirements for de-identification are strict. Information that can 
be used to identify patients is entitled to HIPAA’s safeguards, and the label “de-
identified” is not meant to be a “work-around” to use or disclose patient 
information in ways otherwise prohibited by the Privacy Rule.  
 
Removing all of the information that can be used to identify patients 
protects the patients from the misuse of that information by entities not entitled to 
possess it, including by entities who believe they are not subject to HIPAA’s 
jurisdiction. As discussed in Section D of Part IV, however, removing identifiable 
information will often impair the use of that information for certain purposes. If a 
research protocol studies the relationship between specific health conditions and 
patients’ gender, dates of birth and zip codes, it may be impossible for that 
research to be done with information that cannot be used to identify those 
patients. As also discussed, HIPAA recognizes this reality by allowing multiple 
pathways for researchers to access this identifiable patient information subject to 
HIPAA’s protections. 
 
In the private sphere, however, some organizations have taken a different 
approach. When a purchaser is willing to pay a premium for medical records that 
potentially could be used to identify patients, some organizations appear to have 
chosen to downplay the identifiability of those records by labeling them “de-
identified.” To justify labeling identifiable information “de-identified,” parties 
have looked to certain permissive “de-identification guidelines.” This Part IV 
examines in detail one of those guidelines, Concepts and Methods for De-
 
157 Id. Note also that of the most important and widespread uses of patient information authorized 
under HIPAA is for “quality improvement activities” pursuant to paragraph (1) of HIPAA’s 
definition of “health care operations.” See, paragraph (1) of definition of “health care operations” 
at 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. Under paragraph (1), healthcare organizations can utilize identifiable 
patient information for a variety of healthcare quality improvement and assessment activities, 
including evaluating clinical outcomes, developing clinical guidelines, developing protocols and 
patient safety activities.  
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Identifying Clinical Trial Data158 (hereinafter Concepts). A number of similar 
permissive guidelines exist that share Concepts’ objective, methods and results.159  
 
As will be discussed in detail below, the goal of these permissive “de-
identification guidelines” is not to ensure that information labeled “de-identified” 
is sufficiently devoid of identifying information so that it can be safely 
disseminated as contemplated by Section 502(d)(2).160 Rather, it is to provide a 
rationale for applying the label “de-identified” to patient information that often 
can be used to identify many, most or even all of the patients involved. Because 
their objectives are fundamentally different than those of Section 514(a) of 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, these permissive guidelines abandon HIPAA’s 
implementation specifications in Sections 514(b) and (c).  
 
If, for example, a data broker is willing to pay a healthcare organization to 
replace its patients’ direct identifiers with identification codes controlled by the 
broker (or its agent), these permissive guidelines ignore most of Section 514(c)’s 
requirements. As a result, these guidelines allow the parties to label the healthcare 
organization’s patients’ identification codes as “de-identified” even in situations 
where the codes can be used by the broker (or its agent) to identify all of those 
patients.  
 
These guidelines wholly disregard Section 514(b)’s requirements. Rather 
than requiring healthcare organizations to follow Section 514(b)(1)’s “statistical 
confirmation” method or Section 514(b)(2)’s “safe harbor” method, these 
permissive guidelines allow healthcare organizations to label identifiable 
information as “de-identified” if a number of ambiguously defined or 
administered conditions are satisfied. 
 
The first requirement is that their approach applies only to “nonpublic data 
disclosures.” These are disclosures a healthcare organization may make to any 
commercial partner, for example, when a pharmacy sells its patients’ prescription 
records to a data broker. 
 
 
158 Khaled El Emam & Bradley Malin, Concepts and Methods for De-identifying Clinical Trial 
Data, in APPENDIX B of SHARING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA, MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, MINIMIZING 
RISK 203 (Institute of Medicine of the National Academies 2015) [hereinafter Concepts]. 
159 See, e.g., Khaled El Emam, GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL HEALTH 
INFORMATION, (CRC Press, 2013); De-identification Guidelines, INFO. & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER 
OF ONTARIO (June 2016) [hereinafter De-identification Guidelines], https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Deidentification-Guidelines-for-Structured-Data.pdf. 
160 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (“The requirements of [HIPAA’s Privacy Rule] do not apply to 
information that has been de-identified in accordance with the applicable requirements of § 
164.514 …”). 
 69 
The second requirement is that the data broker must contractually promise 
not to abuse its ability to identify patients. The guidelines allow the parties to 
decide for themselves how strict or enforceable this promise needs to be.  
 
The third requirement is that the healthcare organization ensures that all of 
its patients’ direct identifiers are removed. As noted above, however, Concepts 
allows the data broker (or its agent) to replace the patients’ identifiers with 
identification codes in contravention of Section 514(c). Also in contravention of 
Section 514(c), Concepts allows the parties to label those identification codes “de-
identified” even when the broker (or its agent) have enough control over how 
those identification codes are deployed and utilized so that they can be used to 
identify the healthcare organization’s patients. 
 
As this stage, the permissive guidelines apply the label “de-identified” to 
describe the identification codes and indirect identifiers the broker is purchasing. 
This vocabulary is employed regardless of how easily the broker can use those 
identification codes or indirect identifiers to identify some, many, most or even all 
of the healthcare organization’s patients.  
 
Because this form of “de-identified” information can be used to identify 
patients, the permissive guidelines no longer require healthcare organizations to 
apply “generally acceptable statistical and scientific principles for rendering 
information not individually identifiable.” Instead, a healthcare organization need 
only engage in informed speculation as to whether its patients’ identification 
codes and indirect identifiers being supplied to the data broker will be used to “re-
identify” the patients. 
 
There are no “generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and 
methods” for predicting whether or not a data broker will abuse its ability to 
identify patients. For this reason, permissive guidelines do not require healthcare 
organizations use “generally recognized statistical or scientific methods” in their 
informed speculation. Instead, healthcare organizations are only required to 
perform (i) a set of loosely-described “examinations” of their data broker 
customers; and (ii) a calculation that purports to indicate the likelihood that this 
“de-identified” information will be used to “re-identify” the patients.  
 
The “examinations” the healthcare organization is required to perform are 
of the data broker’s security and privacy practices, its conflicts-of-interests and its 
commercial motivations. Although they purport to be probative of addressing the 
likelihood that the patient identifiers will be used to identify patients, the 
guidelines do not require healthcare organizations to use evidence-based or 
industry-recognized auditing standards or assessment criteria. As a result, the 
healthcare organization getting paid to sell its patients’ medical records is free to 
decide for itself what it deems to be adequate. Moreover, even if the healthcare 
organization’s examination identifies “defects” in the data broker’s practices, 
conflicts-of-interests or motivations, such defects do not disqualify the data 
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broker from obtaining patient data. Rather, the healthcare organization can simply 
treat those defects as remedied if the broker is willing to contractually agree to 
addressing them based on whatever criteria the healthcare organization deems 
adequate. 
 
The calculation that healthcare organizations are required to perform is 
described by the guidelines as a calculation of “actual risk” or “actual re-
identification risk.” The inputs to this calculation, however, are not based on 
generally accepted statistically or scientifically validated principles or methods. 
Rather, the guidelines allow healthcare organizations to use any numbers that are 
“defensible” based on the ability to find those numbers in any publication. Those 
numbers do not need to be validated by generally accepted scientific or statistical 
methods. As will be discussed below, the numbers do not need to be plausible or 
even accurately reflect the published source. To be “defensible,” it appears all that 
is required is that the numbers are published in any “body of work.” 
 
Regardless of whatever numbers the healthcare organization decides are 
“defensible,” the final calculation of “actual re-identification risk” does not need 
to correspond to HIPAA’s definition of “very low probability.” The guidelines 
give healthcare organizations broad discretion to select its own “acceptable risk 
threshold” that can be orders of magnitude higher than HIPAA’s definition of 
“very low probability.” In contrast to the ONC example,161 where 0.013% 
corresponds to a roughly 1-in-7,500 chance of identification, these guidelines 
allow parties to deem values as high as 33% or 1-in-3 as “acceptable,” a figure 
that is over 2,550 times greater than the probability described in the ONC 
example. To be clear, this risk is only deemed “acceptable” by the healthcare 
organization and the data broker. No patients, security researchers or regulators 
have deemed a 1-in-3 an “acceptable” threshold for de-identification.  
 
As malleable as the definitions of “acceptable risk” and “actual re-
identification risk” are, the permissive “de-identification” guidelines allow 
healthcare organizations to significantly understate the actual identifiability of the 
identification codes and indirect identifiers. This is because these permissive 
guidelines only require the parties to assess the “identifiability” of each individual 
release of health information regardless of what other “de-identified” information 
the broker may also have available. So long as the broker promises not to abuse 
its ability to identify patients, the healthcare organization can disregard any other 
“de-identified” information the broker may possess, even if that information can 
be used to identify all of the healthcare organization’s patients. These guidelines 
allow parties to calculate the “actual risk” of identification to be 33%, even in 
circumstances where the broker may possess the 100% ability to identify many, 
most or all of the patients involved.  
 
 
161 See Lafky, supra note 103. 
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B. Concepts and Methods for De-Identifying Clinical Trial Data 
 
Concepts and Methods for De-Identifying Clinical Trial Data,162 is among 
a number of “de-identification guidelines” that purport to describe a method for 
“de-identifying” patient information.  
 
Concepts recognize two categories of “de-identified” information. One 
category is public data releases. “For public data,” Concepts notes that “the 
[healthcare organization] needs to make a worst-case assumption and protect 
against an adversary who is targeting the [patients] with the highest risk of re-
identification.”163 Accordingly, “[f]or a public data release, we assume … it is 
necessary to manage maximum risk.”164 The way Concepts “manage[s] maximum 
risk” is by applying the disclosure limitation techniques described in WORKING 
PAPER 22, such as “generalization,” “suppression,” “randomization” and 
“subsampling,”165 until the information can no longer be used to identify patients. 
Because “there are no other controls”166 that protect patients’ identities, the data 
itself must protect the patients. This appears to be similar to the objectives and 
methods described in Section 514(a) and (b)(1) of the Privacy Rule. 
 
The second category of “de-identified” information Concepts recognizes is 
what it calls “nonpublic data disclosures.” These include patient information that 
a healthcare organization supplies to a private party, for example, when a 
pharmacy sells its patients’ prescription records to a data broker. Concepts’ 
methods for applying the label “de-identified” to “nonpublic data disclosures” 
differ significantly from its requirements for public data disclosures.  
 
Concepts’ approach to the “de-identification” of non-public patient 
information is made up of the following eleven steps: 
Step 1: Determine direct identifiers in the  dataset.  
Step 2: Mask (transform) direct identifiers.  
Step 3: Perform threat modeling.  
Step 4: Determine minimal acceptable data utility.   
Step 5: Determine the re-identification risk threshold.
  
Step 6: Import (sample) data from the source database.  
Step 7: Evaluate the actual re-identification risk.  
Step 8: Compare the actual risk with the threshold. 
Step 9: Set parameters and apply data transformations.  
 
162 El Emam & Malin, Concepts, supra note 158. 
163 Id. at 207. 
164 Id. at 228-29. 
165 Id. at 236-37. 
166 Id. at 229. 
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Step 10: Perform diagnostics on the solution.  
Step 11: Export transformed data to external  dataset.167 
As discussed below, Steps 2, 3, 5 and 7 of Concepts’ approach depart 
significantly from a number of Section 514(a)-(c)’s requirements.  
 
C. Step 2: Mask (Transform) Direct Identifiers 
 
The job of Step 1 in Concepts’ approach is to review the medical records 
in question to inventory all of the patients’ direct identifiers, such as the patients’ 
names, residential addresses, government identification numbers, and the like.  
 
The job of Step 2 is to “mask” or “transform” those direct identifiers. 
Concepts defines “masking” or “transforming” as the “replacement of direct 
identifiers with pseudonyms.”168 If, for example, a medical record originally 
included the patient’s name and social security number, those direct identifiers 
would be replaced with a pseudonym or identification code – such as 
“7iZw4M2k1p.”  The identification code would then serve as a proxy for patients’ 
names and social security numbers.  
 
Under Section 514(b), as well as WORKING PAPER 22 and the 
CHECKLIST,169 the first step of de-identification requires the removal of direct 
identifiers. If, however, a healthcare organization wants to replace its patients’ 
direct identifiers with identification codes that represent those patients, 
Section 514(c) requires healthcare organizations to comply with the following 
four requirements: 
 
1. The identification code must be assigned by the healthcare organization;170  
 
2. The identification code must not be “derived from or related to 
information about the [patient], or “capable of being translated so as to 
identify the patient;” 171  
 
 
167 Id. at 240-43. 
168 Id. at 241. 
169 Working Paper 22, supra note 88, at 78 (“The first step to protect the respondent's 
confidentiality is to remove from the microdata all directly identifying information such as name, 
social security number, exact address, or date of birth.”); CHECKLIST, supra note, at 8 (“Names, 
addresses, and other unique numeric identifiers such as Social Security, Medicare, or Medicaid 
numbers must be removed from the file.”) (emphasis in original). 
170 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c) (“A covered entity may assign a code or other means of record 
identification …”). 
171 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c)(1) (“The code or other means of record identification is not derived 
from or related to information about the [patient] and is not otherwise capable of being translated 
so as to identify the [patient]; …”) (emphasis added). 
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3. The healthcare organization cannot disclose the mechanism for re-
identification to any third party; 172 and 
 
4. The healthcare organization can only use the identification code to re-
identify its own de-identified health information.173  
 
Concepts’ interpretation of Section 514(c), on the other hand, disregards most 
of its requirements. Rather, it describes Section 514(c) as follows: 
… in the HIPAA Privacy Rule at §164.514(c), it is stated that any code 
that is derived from information about an individual is considered 
identifiable data. However, such pseudonyms are practically important for 
knowing which records belong to the same clinical trial participant and 
constructing the longitudinal record of a data subject. Not being able to 
create derived pseudonyms means that random pseudonyms must be 
created. To be able to use random pseudonyms, one must maintain a 
crosswalk between the individual identity and the random pseudonym. 
The crosswalk allows the sponsor to use the same pseudonym for each 
participant across  datasets and to allow re-identification at a future date if 
the need arises. These crosswalks, which are effectively linking tables 
between the pseudonym and the information about the individual, 
arguably present an elevated privacy risk because clearly identifiable 
information must now be stored somehow. Furthermore, the original 
regulations did not impose any controls on this crosswalk table.174 
 
In this passage Concepts describes a hypothetical crosswalk table that 
links each patient’s name to her “pseudonym” (i.e., identification code). Anyone 
possessing this crosswalk table, therefore, is able to identify all of the patients and 
their medical records. Concepts acknowledges that the crosswalk is “clearly 
identifiable information” that “arguably present[s] an elevated privacy risk.”175 
But Concepts states that the “original regulations did not impose any controls on 
this crosswalk table.”176 As a result, Concepts is unable to articulate any specific 
restrictions that apply to it. 
 
 
172 See id. at § 164.514(c)(2) (“The covered entity does not … disclose the mechanism for re-
identification.”) 
173 See id. at § 164.514(c)(2) (“The covered entity does not use or disclose the code or other means 
of record identification for any other purpose …”) (emphasis added). 
174 El Emam & Malin, Concepts, supra note 158, at 212. 
175 Id. (“These crosswalks, which are effectively linking tables between the pseudonym and the 
information about the individual, arguably present an elevated privacy risk because clearly 
identifiable information must now be stored somehow.”). 
176 Id. 
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Concepts’ conclusion that the “original regulations did not impose any 
controls” is manifestly incorrect. Section 514(c) imposes multiple controls on how 
that crosswalk table is maintained. If, for example, the healthcare organization 
assigned the pseudonyms, but provided the researcher with the crosswalk table, 
this would violate each of Section 514(c)’s second, third and fourth controls. As 
HHS noted in its commentary to the “original regulations,” healthcare 
organizations are “prohibited from disclosing the mechanism for re-identification, 
such as tables, algorithms, or other tools that could be used to link the code with 
the subject of the information.”177 Crosswalk tables are not exempt from 
Section 514(c)’s requirements merely because they are named “crosswalk tables.” 
 
As a result of its erroneous interpretation, Concepts expresses concern that 
a crosswalk table is “clearly identifiable information.” Because the “original 
regulations did not impose any controls,” Concepts recommends that any means 
to “reverse th[e] pseudonym[s] [should be] tightly controlled.”178  
 
Concepts, however, does not articulate specific criteria for what it means 
by “tightly controlled.” It appears sufficient that a healthcare organization and a 
data broker enter into any form of agreement or adopt policies to protect this 
“clearly identifiable information” in a manner similar to how researchers 
supervised by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) operate:179  
Under the Common Rule, which guides IRBs, if the data recipient has no 
means of getting the key, for example, through an agreement with the 
sponsor prohibiting the sharing of keys under any circumstances or 
through organizational policies prohibiting such an exchange, then 
creating such derived pseudonyms is an acceptable approach.180 
Concepts’ advice here, however, confuses HIPAA’s regulations that apply to de-
identified information with its regulations that apply to identifiable information. 
Those regulations are very different.  
 
If identification codes are used with individually identifiable health 
information, such as with a limited  dataset or research information under 
Section 512(i), then the parties are not governed by Section 514(c). Rather, they 
are governed by HIPAA’s comprehensive safeguards for individually identifiable 
health information, which include the protections and oversight set forth in 
HIPAA’s Privacy, Security, Breach Notification and Enforcement Rules, and 
could include policies and procedures along the lines referenced in Concepts’ 
passage. If, on the other hand, identification codes are to be used with properly 
 
177 2000 Final Rule, supra note 44, at 82,537 (emphasis added). 
178 El Emam & Malin, Concepts, supra note 158, at 212-13. 
179 Id. at 212. 
180 Id. 
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de-identified information that is utilized in ways that fall outside of HIPAA’s 
safeguards and limitations, then Section 514(c)’s strict controls apply.  
 
HHS discussed this distinction when considering the proposed use of 
HMAC encryption technology to create patient identification codes. Although the 
proposed arrangement violated the controls set forth in Section 514(c) (as 
discussed in Section B of Part III above), those codes could be used with limited  
datasets, which are otherwise protected by HIPAA: 
“The HMAC methodology, however, may be used in the context of the 
limited dataset …. The limited dataset contains individually identifiable 
health information and is not a de-identified dataset. Creation of a limited 
dataset for research with a data use agreement, as specified in § 
164.514(e), would not preclude inclusion of the keyed-hash message 
authentication code in the limited  dataset.” 181 
 
Under Concepts’ approach, however, identification codes are not protected 
by either HIPAA or Section 514(c). Rather, all that is required is that the parties 
enter into an agreement or adopt a nebulous set of policies that facially appear to 
manifest “tight controls.” 
 
Concepts does recognize one of Section 514(c)’s four controls, namely 
that the identification code must not be “derived from or related to information 
about the [patient], or “capable of being translated so as to identify the patient;” 
182 Once again, however, Concepts misstates what HIPAA requires.  
 
Concepts’ understanding is based on its interpretation of guidance from 
HHS’s Office of Civil Rights (hereinafter referred to as OCR) regarding 
cryptographic algorithms: 
“… in the recent guidelines from OCR, this is clarified to state that ‘a 
covered entity may disclose codes derived from PHI (protected health 
information) as part of a de-identified  dataset if an expert determines that 
the data meets the de-identification requirements at §164.514(b)(1).’ 
(HHS, 2012, p. 22). This means that a derived code, such as an encryption 
or hash function, can be used as a pseudonym as long as there is 
assurance that the means to reverse that pseudonym are tightly 
controlled.”183 
 
181 2002 Final Rule, supra note 74, at 53233 (emphasis added). 
182 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c)(1) (“The code or other means of record identification is not derived 
from or related to information about the [patient] and is not otherwise capable of being translated 
so as to identify the [patient]; …”) (emphasis added). 
183 El Emam & Malin, Concepts, supra note 158, at 212-13. 
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The referenced guidance is taken from OCR’s “Guidance Regarding Methods for 
De-identification,184 which states in relevant part: 
“The re-identification provision in §164.514(c) does not preclude the 
transformation of PHI into values derived by cryptographic hash functions 
using the expert determination method, provided the keys associated with 
such functions are not disclosed, including to the recipients of the 
deidentified information.”185  
 
Notably, Concepts omits a critical caveat in the OCR guidance, namely, 
that cryptographic identification codes can only be used if “the keys associated 
with such functions are not disclosed, including to the recipients of the de-
identified information.”186 This echoes requirements of Section 514(c) as well as 
HHS’s guidance regarding the HMAC algorithm. 
 
Concepts’ omission of this caveat, along with the other controls in 
Section 514(c), allows the parties to choose for themselves the ways they want to 
“tightly control” the identification codes and the technology used to create them. 
Concepts does not prohibit, for example, healthcare organizations from allowing 
their paying customers to use their patients’ identification codes to aggregate all 
of their medical information, even if that information could be used by the broker 
or its agent to identify all of the healthcare organization’s patients. Nor does it 
place any restrictions on who can assign the identification codes, even if that 
assignment could result in the data broker or its agent having the ability to 
identify 100% of all of the healthcare organization’s patients. In either case, 
Concepts allows the parties to label the identification codes as “de-identified.” 
 
D. Step 3: Perform Threat-Modeling 
 
Step 3 consists of two components: 
(1)  identification of the plausible adversaries and what information 
they may be able to access; and 
(2)  determination of the quasi-identifiers.187 
 
The second component of this Step – the determination of quasi-identifiers 
– refers to creating an inventory of “quasi-identifiers,” another name for indirect 
 
184 OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDANCE 
REGARDING METHODS FOR DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPPA) 
PRIVACY RULE 22 (2015) [hereinafter OCR GUIDANCE], 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/De-
identification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf. 
185 Id. (emphasis added). 
186Id. 
187 El Emam & Malin, Concepts, supra note 158, at 242. 
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identifiers. This process is similar to what is required by WORKING PAPER 22 
when preparing de-identified health information in accordance with 
Section 514(b)(1). The first element of Concepts’ Step 3, however, diverges 
significantly from Section 514(b)(1)’s requirements.  
 
This departure begins with the vocabulary Step 3 uses: Concepts 
presupposes that the indirect identifiers and identification codes resulting from 
Step 2 are already “de-identified.” From HIPAA’s perspective, these indirect 
identifiers and identification codes continue to be individually identifiable health 
information because: 
1. The medical records continue to include all of the patients’ indirect 
identifiers; and 
2. The identification codes do not comply with the requirements of 
Section 514(c). 
From Step 3’s perspective, on the other hand, these identifiable patient records 
can be labeled “de-identified” if the data purchaser promises not to abuse its 
ability to use the indirect identifiers and identification codes to “re-identify” the 
patients. 
 
The second departure involves the assessment the healthcare organization 
is required to perform. Under Section 514(b)(1)’s express language, the healthcare 
organization must remove all potential indirect identifiers until it can be 
demonstrated – by applying “generally accepted statistical and scientific 
principles and methods for rendering information not individually identifiable” – 
that there is a very low probability that the remaining indirect identifiers (and 
identification codes) could be used by the data purchaser to identify any of the 
patients.  
 
Step 3, on the other hand, is not focused on ensuring that this information 
cannot be used to identify patients. Instead, Step 3 requires the healthcare 
organization only to document its informed speculation regarding whether or not 
indirect identifiers (and identification codes) will be used to “re-identify” 
healthcare organization’s patients.  
 
Attempting to predict what a data broker would do with identifiable 
patient information is very different than assessing whether information could be 
used to identify patients. There is a large volume of “generally accepted statistical 
and scientific principles and methods for rendering information not individually 
identifiable,” many of which are discussed in WORKING PAPER 22. But there are 
no “generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods” for 
predicting whether or not a data broker will abuse its ability to identify patients.  
 
For this reason, Concepts does not require that the healthcare organization 
utilize “generally recognized statistical or scientific methods,” much less methods 
for “rendering information not individually identifiable.” Rather, Concepts only 
requires that the healthcare organization use a method that is “generally known” 
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and “justified” by a “body of work.” The “body of work” does not need to be 
scientifically or statistically valid, and it does not need to be generally accepted by 
scientists or statisticians. It simply needs to be “generally known.” 
 
Concepts’ rationale for this approach is based on a puzzling misreading of 
Section 514(b)(1)’s express language: 
“The de-identification must be based on generally accepted statistical and 
scientific principles and methods for rendering information not 
individually identifiable. This means that the [healthcare organization] 
needs to ensure that there is a body of work that justifies and evaluates the 
methods that are used for the de-identification and that these methods 
must be generally known.”188  
Similar to how Concepts’ misreading of Section 514(c) omits three-fourths of 
Section 514(c)’s express requirements,189 Concepts’ interpretation of 
Section 514(b)(1) omits three of Section 514(b)(1)’s express requirements.  
 
First, Concepts’ method for labeling information “de-identified” no longer 
requires that it must be a “method for rendering information not individually 
identifiable.” Second, it no longer needs to be a statistical or scientific method. 
Although the method needs to be “justified” by a “body of work,” that 
justification does not need to be statistically or scientifically valid, and the “body 
of work” does not need to be bona fide statistical or scientific methods or 
principles. Third, the method no longer needs to be “generally accepted.” Instead, 
it is sufficient if the “body of work” is “generally known.” Concepts’ 
interpretation, for example, does not disqualify a method even if it is “generally 
known” to be ineffective. Being “generally known” is sufficient. 
 
Thus, so long as a data purchaser promises not to use the indirect 
identifiers and identification codes it will be receiving to “re-identify” a 
healthcare organization’s patients, Concepts allows the parties to label the 
information “de-identified” notwithstanding the fact that it can be used to identify 
those patients. And because Concepts permits the parties to apply the label “de-
identified” to information that can be used to identify patients, it no longer 
requires the parties to apply “generally acceptable statistical and scientific 
principles for rendering information not individually identifiable.” Instead, the 
healthcare organization needs only to engage in informed speculation as to 
whether the indirect identifiers and identification codes being supplied to the data 
purchaser will be used to “re-identify” healthcare organization’s patients.  
 
Step 3 contemplates three potential ways that the identifiable patient 
information could be “re-identified:”  
 
188 Id. at 211. 
189 See discussion supra Section IV.C.  
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• A deliberate attack, which happens when the data broker (or agent) 
deliberately attempts to “re-identify” patients in the  dataset; 
• An inadvertent attack, which transpires when a data analyst working 
with the data broker (or the data broker itself) inadvertently “re-
identifies” someone in the  dataset; and 
• A breach, which occurs if there is a data breach at the broker’s 
facility.190  
Concepts characterizes these risks as “cover[ing] the universe of attacks.”191  
 
The inconsistency between Concepts’ vocabulary and HIPAA’s language 
makes it difficult to assess precisely what Concepts means by “re-identify” or 
“breach.” For example, because the indirect identifiers and identification codes 
are not de-identified in accordance with HIPAA’s requirements, there is no 
unambiguous interpretation of what Concepts means by “re-identifying” 
information that was never de-identified to begin with. Presumably re-inserting 
the patients’ direct identifiers would qualify. But without a rigorous definition, 
parties looking to profit from using patients’ medical records in ways that would 
otherwise violate HIPAA could define “re-identification” narrowly to suit those 
objectives. They could, for example, create “de-identified” profiles about patients 
to generate “risk scores” about them using the patients’ identification codes. 
Because those “predictive models” were created with patient profiles purporting 
to be “de-identified,” a broker could decide that they could sell those “risk scores” 
to the patients’ employers or insurers who wouldn’t be allowed to receive the 
same substantive information if it were acknowledged to be derived from the 
patients’ medical records.  
 
Concepts’ definition of “a breach” is likewise ambiguous. It, therefore, 
fails to define with any specificity how its identifiable form of “de-identified” 
information should be assessed in determining whether a breach has occurred and 
the extent to which it needs to be reported.  
 
1. What Kind of Contract Does a Data Broker Need to Sign to Allow Patient 
Identifiers to Be Considered “De-Identified?” 
 
In order to label indirect identifiers and identification codes “de-
identified,” Concepts requires data purchaser “to sign a contract that contains the 
relevant prohibitions.”192 Concepts, however, describes only three of these 
“relevant prohibitions:” 
• Prohibition on “re-identification;” 
• Restrictions on linking the data with other  datasets; and 
 
190 El Emam & Malin, Concepts, supra note 158, at 229 (“For a nonpublic data set, we consider 
three types of attacks that cover the universe of attacks …”). 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 230. 
 80 
• Disallowing the sharing of the data with other third parties. 193 
 
As discussed in the previous section, Concepts does not offer an 
unambiguous definition of what it means by “re-identification.” Concepts does 
not discuss, for example, whether the use of its identifiable form of “de-
identified” information in ways that would violate HIPAA if it were 
acknowledged to be identifiable constitutes “re-identification.” Nor does it 
provide clarity about what kinds of “restrictions on linking” and “sharing” are 
specifically required. Nor does Concepts discuss other provisions that often would 
be considered if the information in question were acknowledged to be individually 
identifiable health information, such as: 
• What are the consequences if the purportedly “de-identified” information 
is deliberately or inadvertently “re-identified?” Should patients be notified 
of the breach? Should HHS and State Attorneys General be notified? 
• Should healthcare organizations be required to note such disclosures in 
their accounting of disclosures to their patients?  
• What kinds of disclaimers or limitations of liability are appropriate given 
the identifiability of the information?  
• Should patients be included as third-party beneficiaries in the event the 
patient identifiers are “re-identified?”  
• What security standards are required for safeguarding such identifiers? 
• What data breach standards should be applied to assessing whether or not 
a data breach has occurred?  
• Who is authorized to evaluate the substance, suitability and effectiveness 
of the data purchaser’s agreement?   
Concepts does not condition its application of the label “de-identified” on how the 
parties answer any of these questions.  
 
Moreover, Concepts does not discuss the inherent weakness of contracts 
when they are the only tool that is protecting patient privacy. In practice, contracts 
often offer weak incentives to comply with their obligations. Contracts frequently 
significantly limit the parties’ financial liability and disclaim liability to “third 
party beneficiaries,” such as patients, who may be adversely impacted by the 
parties’ behavior. Enforcing contracts in court is expensive and time-consuming. 
As a result, many companies do not enforce their contracts and other companies 
calibrate their compliance efforts against the “practical risk” hoping they can get 
away with contract violations indefinitely. The 1978 version of Working Paper, 
known as “WORKING PAPER 2,”194 discussed the inherent weakness of contracts in 
describing the results of a compliance audit conducted by Bureau of Census. The 
Bureau noted that: 
 
193 Id. at 235. 
194 Report on Statistical Disclosure and Disclosure-Avoidance Techniques (Office of Federal 
Statistical Policy and Standards, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Working Paper 2, 1978) [hereinafter 
Working Paper 2]. 
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“… it was apparent that the sample purchasers either did not take their 
signed agreement seriously, forgot it after a period of time, or were not 
able to control handling of the file at their institutions. In a few cases the 
agreement had been signed by a university purchasing agent and was 
unknown to the actual users.195 
This notorious compliance risk is why HIPAA extends its protections regardless 
of what parties agree to in their contracts. Even if the parties attempt to shield 
themselves from liability, the protections of HIPAA’s Privacy, Security, Breach 
Notification and Enforcement Rules supply protections the parties may omit.  
 
Step 3’s approach leaves it entirely to the discretion of the healthcare 
organization to decide how it wants to protect its patients’ “de-identified” patient 
identifiers. The contract can have fulsome protective provisions accompanied by 
rigorous compliance monitoring. Or it could have ambiguous prohibitions that 
give the data purchaser significant flexibility to decide for itself how it will use 
the healthcare organization’s patients’ medical records. 
 
E. Step 5: Determine the Re-Identification Risk Threshold 
 
Under Section 514(b)(1), medical records qualify as “de-identified” only if 
there is a very low probability, measured using bona fide statistical and scientific 
methods, that a broker could use the medical records to identify patients. As 
previously discussed, for example, the HHS’s ONC commissioned a research 
team to attempt to identify approximately 15,000 individuals whose medical 
records were redacted in accordance with Section 514(b)(2)(i). The research team 
compared those records with consumer data provided by a national data broker 
and was able to identify two of 15,000 individuals, or 0.013% of the 
population.196 This is equivalent to a 1-in-7,500 chance that the data could be used 
to identify a patient. Although this low percentage has not been recognized as an 
“acceptable error rate,” it illustrates that patient identifiability is measured using 
bona fide “statistical and scientific principles and methods for rendering 
information not identifiable.” 
 
Concepts’ Step 5, in contrast, allows healthcare organizations and their 
customers to select their own “acceptable risk threshold.” Because this is a 
selection process, not a statistical or scientific process, the parties are free to 
select “acceptable risk thresholds” that are orders of magnitude higher than the 
ONC example. Concepts allows the parties to agree to “acceptable risk 
thresholds” that are as high as a 1-in-3 chance that a patient could be identified 
from the medical records.197  
 
195 Id. at 31. 
196 See Lafky, supra note 103. 
197 El Emam & Malin, Concepts, supra note 158, at 233 (depicting a chart of “commonly used risk 
thresholds” of 1-in-11, 1-in-5 and 1-in-3 chance that the data could be used to identify patients). 
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In a chart depicting 27 sample patients, for example, Concepts shows 
“probability of re-identification” for each patient in the sample.198 On one end of 
the spectrum, there are nine patients listed, each of whose medical records have a 
“probability of re-identification” of 33%, or approximately a one-in-three 
chance.199 On the other end are eight patients, each of whose records have a 
“probability of re-identification” of 12.5%, or a one-in-eight chance.200 The 
average “probability of re-identification” for each of the 27 patients is 22%,201 or 
approximately a one-in-five chance that each patient’s medical records could be 
used to identify her. There is no assessment of the likelihood that “at least 1 
patient” can be identified, or “at least n patients202” can be identified, numbers 
which naturally increase with every new patient added to the analysis. 
 
Because Step 5 is a selection process, there is no statistical or scientific 
justification for why Concepts’ “acceptable risk threshold” is approximately 2,500 
times less secure than the ONC’s re-identification demonstration. Concepts, 
however, offers non-scientific rationales based on its misinterpretation of 
Section 514(b)(1)’s express requirements. 
 
As discussed in Section D above, Concepts’ interpretation of 
Section 514(b)(1) omits three express requirements. First, Concepts’ method for 
labeling information “de-identified” no longer requires that healthcare 
organizations use “methods for rendering information not individually 
identifiable.” Second, it no longer requires healthcare organizations to use 
statistical or scientific methods. Third, it no longer requires healthcare 
organizations to use methods that are “generally accepted” rather than simply 
“known.” 
 
Consequently, the “acceptable risk threshold” no longer needs to be 
equivalent to a very low probability as defined by the application of “generally 
accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for rendering 
information not individually identifiable.” Instead, the parties are free to use any 
way of “measuring re-identification risk in a defensible way and have a repeatable 
process to follow that allows for the definition of very small risk.”203  
 
 
198 Id. at 227 (“Table B-5: The Generalized Data Set with No Uniques or Doubles”). 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 237 (“…. It was possible to further reduce the average risk to 0.22 in Table B-5.”). 
202 The author uses “n” here to refer to an arbitrary sample size number.  
 
203 Id. at 211. 
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This “repeatable process” does not need to be validated by bona fide 
statistical or scientific methods or principles. It simply needs to be included in a 
“body of work” and “generally known,” even if unscientific. Concepts definition 
of “generally known,” itself, appears to be remarkably lenient. Although Concepts 
acknowledges that it would “difficult” to classify “undocumented methods or 
proprietary methods that have never been published” as “generally known,” it 
does not categorically prohibit healthcare organizations from doing so.”204 
 
Concepts, therefore, deems a risk threshold of 33% acceptable because 
other permissive “de-identification guidelines” also use the word “acceptable” to 
describe 33%,205 and is “commonly used … based on the review/references in the 
text.”206 Concepts does not assert that a 33% risk is an “acceptable” threshold 
based on “generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for 
rendering information not individually identifiable” or that there is any 
statistically or scientifically validated methods or principles that would assign a 
one-in-three risk as “acceptable.” Nor does Concepts assert that a one-in-t risk is 
acceptable to regulators, data protection researchers or the patients whose medical 
records are being sold without their knowledge. 
 
In order for the parties to select Concepts’ notably high “acceptable risk 
thresholds,” Concepts requires an examination of the “context of the data”207 or 
the “factors characterizing the [data broker] and the data themselves.”208 What 
Concepts means by “context” and “factors” are the following: 
• The data purchaser’s privacy and security practices; 
• The data purchaser’s commercial motivations; and  
• The data purchaser’s conflicts of interest.209 
 
 
204 Id. (“… undocumented methods or proprietary methods that have never been published would 
be difficult to classify as ‘generally accepted.’”). 
205 Id., at 230-31 (“There are quite a few precedents for what can be considered an acceptable 
amount of risk …”) (citing El Emam, GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERS. HEALTH INFO., 
supra note 159). 
206 Id. at 237 (describing identification risk thresholds of .33 as “commonly used”). 
207 E.g., id. at 234 (“Selecting an acceptable threshold … requires an examination of the context of 
the data themselves.”); at 236 (“… the amount of data transformation needed will be a function of 
these other contextual factors. For example, if the [data broker] has good security and privacy 
practices in place, the threshold chosen will be higher, which means that the data will be subjected 
to less de-identification.”). 
208 Id. at 234 (“The re-identification risk threshold is determined based on factors characterizing 
the [data broker] and the data themselves.”). 
209 Id. at 233-34. 
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If the healthcare organization has a favorable impression of the data purchaser’s 
“factors,” Concepts permits the healthcare organization to apply the notably high 
“acceptable risk thresholds” described above.  
 
Like the “acceptable risk thresholds” themselves, however, the healthcare 
organization’s “examination” of these “factors” has not been validated by 
statistical or scientific methods. Rather, these factors are highly subjective in 
nature, and are described as only being “in use informally.”210 Consequently, the 
healthcare organization getting paid to sell its patients’ medical information and 
selecting its own “acceptable risk threshold” is also being tasked with selecting 
how stringently it wants to examine the “context of the data” justifying both.  
 
1. Examining a Data Purchaser’s Security and Privacy Practices 
 
In order to “examine” a data purchaser’s security and privacy practices, 
Concepts references “a collection of practices used by large data custodians”211 
that are listed in a separate article written by one of Concepts’ authors.212 The 
article identifies approximately 40 privacy and security controls, partially 
excerpted below:213 
Checklist of Practices That Must Be in Place at a Higher Threshold for 
Re-identification Risk, as Detailed in Policies, Guidelines, and 
Application Forms of Various Bodies 
 
Controlling access, disclosure, retention, and disposition of personal 
data 
• Requestor allows only “authorized” staff to access and use data on a 
“need-to-know” basis (i.e., when required to perform their duties). 
• Data-sharing agreement between collaborators and subcontractors has 
been or will be implemented. 
• Nondisclosure or confidentiality agreement (pledge of confidentiality) 
is in place for all staff, including external collaborators and 
contractors. 
• Requestor will only publish or disclose aggregated data that do not 
allow identification of individuals. 
• Long-term retention of personal data will be subject to periodic audits 
and oversight by independent bodies. 
• Data will be disposed of after a specified retention period. 
 
210 Id. at 233. 
211 Id. at 234. 
212 Khaled El Emam, et. al, Evaluating the Risk of Re-identification of Patients from Hospital 
Prescription Records, 62 CAN. J. OF HOSP. PHARMACY, 307 (July–Aug. 2009) [hereinafter 
Evaluating the Risk of Re-identification]. 
213 Id. at 318. 
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• Information will not be processed, stored, or maintained outside of [the 
country], and parties outside of [the country] will not have access to 
the data. 
• Data will not be disclosed or shared with third parties. 
 
Neither Concepts nor the article it references describe how the checklist is 
to be used to “examine” a given data broker. Because the checklist corresponds to 
a list of data protection principles that can be found on the Internet, most of the 
“practices” Concepts expressly requires could be auto-generated using off-the-
shelf software.214 Without a validated auditing protocol, the list on its own is 
incapable of distinguishing between bona fide data protection controls from pro 
forma documents that have been auto-generated.  
 
On one extreme, the parties could interpret Step 5’s examination to require 
a thorough review of the suitability and effectiveness of the broker’s privacy and 
security controls. Such an audit, for example, could require a thorough review of 
every documented policy, security incident report and breach assessments, and 
complaints from personnel, contractors and customers. To ensure that the broker 
is complying with its controls, the audit could require a review of sales and 
supplier contracts, marketing materials, sales proposals and product requirements. 
To ensure that the broker has appointed qualified personnel, the credentials and 
qualifications of all security and privacy personnel could be reviewed, followed 
by interviews to ensure that the individuals possess the requisite knowledge of 
applicable regulations and industry standards, as well as the broker’s own internal 
controls. To ensure that the broker’s compliance function is not subject to undue 
influence, the broker’s organizational chart could be reviewed, along with the 
employment agreements of compliance personnel to ensure that they do not have 
a financial incentive to overlook significant compliance violations. To ensure that 
these matters are reviewed by appropriately qualified professionals who do not 
have any conflicts-of-interest, the statistician could require that the foregoing 
matters are reviewed by independent security and law firms whose fees must be 
paid regardless of the outcome of their assessments.  
 
On the other extreme, the healthcare organization is free to interpret Step 
5’s “informal” “examination” to require only that the broker produce a list of 
auto-generated policies and procedures. Because Concepts does not require that 
these documents be read or understood by a qualified professional, the healthcare 
organization would never realize if the auto-generated policies are inconsistent 
with contemplated transaction. Further, because the healthcare organization has 
never compared the policies to the broker’s actual practices, it would never realize 
if the broker has never complied with those auto-generated policies. Because the 
healthcare organization has never reviewed the broker’s sales proposals or 
 
214 See, e.g., APTIBLE, https://www.aptible.com/documentation/comply/reference/pdf-exports.html 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2020) (Aptible’s documentation solution, that allows policies to be auto-
generated based on user inputs.).  
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product requirements, the statistician would never learn if the broker intended to 
breach its data use agreement. Because the healthcare organization has never 
reviewed the qualifications of the broker’s security and privacy professionals, the 
statistician is in no position to assess whether the broker has appointed qualified 
personnel supervising those functions. Despite the fact that such an “examination” 
only requires that the broker produce a set of unreviewed policies, Concepts 
allows the parties to deem such an examination sufficient to warrant an 
“acceptable risk threshold” of 33%. 
 
2. Evaluating Conflicts-of-Interest and Commercial Motivations 
 
In addition to making sure that “security and privacy practices [have been] 
put in place,” Step 5 calls for an examination of “issues [such] as conflicts of 
interest, the potential for financial gain from re-identification.215 Concepts, 
however, does not provide any framework for evaluating such conflicts or 
commercial motivations. This is notable given that Concepts’ process itself gives 
rise to a number of inherent conflicts, including the following: 
• The data broker has a financial interest in labeling as much detailed patient 
information as possible as “de-identified” because it enhances the broker’s 
ability to commercialize it and reduce compliance costs; 
• The healthcare organization supplying the patient information has a 
financial interest in labeling medical records “de-identified” in situations 
where the broker is willing to pay a premium for records that are classified 
as “de-identified;” and  
• Any “de-identification expert” hired by the parties has a financial interest 
in obtaining the fees by assisting healthcare organizations and data brokers 
in classifying as much of the detailed patient information as possible as 
“de-identified.” If the “expert” is deemed “uncooperative” in supporting 
the parties’ commercial objectives, the statistician puts future 
engagements at risk. 
 
Because Concepts does not identify its own conflicts-of-interest, it 
provides no guidance on any of the following questions: (i) what it specifically 
means by “conflicts-of-interest,” (ii) who is authorized to examine these conflicts, 
or (iii) what criteria should be used to assess whether or not such conflicts are 
problematic. The healthcare organization is free to conduct these examinations 
based on any standard it deems suitable.  
 
Examining the “potential for financial gain” is similarly problematic. A 
principal motivation for HIPAA was the inherent financial interest associated with 
selling patient information. The “potential for financial gain from re-
identification” applies to all data brokers and healthcare organizations. Without 
any protocols or assessment criteria for defining what Concepts means by 
 
215 El Emam & Malin, Concepts, supra note 158, at 234-35. 
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“potential for financial gain,” healthcare organizations are free to decide for 
themselves the scope of their examinations and the weight they give to them.  
 
3. No Disqualifying Defects: Remedying Defects Found in Informal 
Examinations 
 
Despite not providing any evidence-based auditing standards or 
assessment criteria for their informal “examinations,” Concepts recognizes that it 
is possible for healthcare organizations to find one or more defects in a broker’s 
mitigating controls or commercial motivations.  
 
None of those defects, however, appear to ever disqualify data brokers 
from receiving patient identifiers. Rather, it appears that any defect in a data 
broker’s controls or motivation can be deemed cured if the healthcare 
organization beefs up its contract with the broker: 
“The security and privacy practices of the [broker] can be manipulated 
through contracts. The contract signed by the [broker] can impose a 
certain list of practices that must be in place, which are the basis for 
determining the threshold. Therefore, they must be in place by the [broker] 
to justify the level of transformation performed on the data.”216 
 
A real-world example of this is seen in Evaluating the Risk of Re-
identification, written by one of Concepts’ authors, which involved the “de-
identification” of patient prescription records that a hospital was providing to a 
company developing a “database of prescription records.”217  
 
The patient information in question was protected by Ontario’s Personal 
Health Information Privacy Act, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as “PHIPA”)218 
rather than HIPAA. Similar to HIPAA, however, PHIPA defines patient 
information as “information that identifies a [patient] or for which it is reasonably 
foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be utilized, either alone or with 
other information, to identify a [patient].”219 Also like HIPAA, PHIPA mandates 
that a “health information custodian” cannot disclose “personal health 
information” about a patient without obtaining the patient’s consent.220  
 
 
216 Id. at 236. 
217 See El Emam, supra note 211, at 308. 
218 Pers. Health Info. Prot. Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 3, Sched. A. 
219 See, id., definitions of “identifying information” at 2004, c. 3, Sched. A, s. 4 (1), and “personal 
health information” at 4 (2) (emphasis added).  
220 Id. at 2004, c. 3, Sched. A, s. 29 (“A health information custodian shall not collect, use or 
disclose personal health information about an individual unless … it has the individual’s consent 
under this Act …”). 
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The project ran into a snag when the application of bona fide statistical 
techniques was deemed “unacceptable” to the data broker.221 Rather than 
acknowledging the possibility that the patient information being requested was 
identifiable, the parties’ strategy was to increase the “acceptable risk threshold” to 
ensure that the medical records would be labeled “de-identified.”222 As noted in 
the article, “[i]f it is not possible to obtain a good de-identification … the 
threshold is increased […].”223 
 
Increasing the threshold, however, came at a price: “[…] the higher 
probability threshold must be balanced with greater security and privacy practices 
by the data recipient.”224 The article then lists the controls described above that 
“need to be in place” in order for the medical records to be labeled “de-
identified.”225  
 
A second snag arose when it was determined that the broker did not 
actually have to have the relevant security or privacy practices in place. This 
defect, however, did not disqualify the data broker from obtaining the “good de-
identification” or the higher “acceptable risk threshold.” Instead of disqualifying 
the data broker, the broker’s practices could be deemed adequate so long as it 
agreed to implement additional controls in its data use agreement.226 There is no 
requirement that the healthcare organization directly confirm that the practices 
have been put into place, or that the healthcare organization actively monitor the 
broker to ensure that none of its patients’ medical records are misused. As 
discussed above, in practice, contracts often offer weak incentives to comply with 
obligations viewed as cumbersome. 
 
F. Step 7: Evaluate the Actual Re-Identification Risk 
 
Concepts entitles Step 7 “evaluate the actual re-identification risk.” Use of 
the word “actual” implies Step 7 seeks to objectively measure the real-world risk 
that the nominally “de-identified” patient identifiers given to the data broker will 
be compromised. In reality, Step 7 only requires the parties perform a calculation 
using numbers the parties are largely free to select. This calculation does not 
measure anything “actual” about the risk to the data. Instead, it is a method for 
generating numerical values that will be lower than the “acceptable risk 
 
221 El Emam, supra note 211, at 314. 
222 Id. at 314. 
223 Id. at 313. 
224 Id. at 313. 
225 Id. at 313 (“Appendix 1 lists the practices that need to be in place at the higher threshold.”). 
226 Id. at 307. 
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threshold” selected in Step 5 without the need to consider the actual risk to the 
data itself. 
 
Step 7 is yet another instance of where Concepts abandons 
Section 514(b)(1)’s requirement to apply “generally accepted statistical and 
scientific methods for rendering information not individually identifiable.” As 
discussed in Sections D and E above, Concepts only requires that the parties use a 
method that is “generally known” in a “body of work” that gives “repeatable” 
results. The “body of work” does not need to be statistically or scientifically valid, 
nor does it need to be a generally accepted statistical or scientific method. The 
“repeatability” of the numbers used does not need to be the result of a statistically 
or scientifically validated measurement. Instead, it is sufficient if the 
“repeatability” is a byproduct of the fact that the parties copy numbers from other 
permissive “de-identification guidelines.” 
 
The calculation contemplated by Step 7 echoes Step 3’s “threat modeling.” 
As discussed in Section D above, Step 3 permits the parties to label patients’ 
indirect identifiers and identification codes as “de-identified” if the data broker 
promises not to use that identifiable information to “re-identify” the healthcare 
organization’s patients. Because this form of “de-identified” information can be 
used to identify patients, Concepts no longer requires the parties to apply 
“generally acceptable statistical and scientific principles for rendering information 
not individually identifiable.” Instead, the healthcare organization need only 
engage in informed speculation as to whether the indirect identifiers and 
identification codes being supplied to the data purchaser will be used to “re-
identify” healthcare organization’s patients. Under Step 3, this informed 
speculation contemplates three potential ways that the identifiable patient 
information could be “re-identified:” 
• A deliberate attack, where the adversary deliberately attempts to “re-
identify” individuals in the  dataset; 
• An inadvertent attack, where a data analyst working with the data broker 
(or the data broker itself) inadvertently “re-identifies” someone in the  
dataset; or 
• A breach, where there is a data breach at the broker’s facility.227  
 
Step 7’s calculation of “actual re-identification risk” builds on these 
assumptions by requiring the parties to assign numerical values to each of these 
possibilities by using the following formulas: 
(1) Pr(re-id, attempt) = Pr(re-id | attempt) × Pr(attempt), where the 
term Pr(attempt) captures the probability that a deliberate attempt to re-
identify the data will be made by the data recipient; 
(2) Pr(re-id, attempt) = Pr(re-id | attempt) × Pr(attempt), which 
evaluates the probability of that data broker’s personnel may inadvertently 
re-identify someone in the  dataset. 
 
227 Id. at 229. 
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(3) Pr(re-id, breach) = Pr(re-id | breach) × Pr(breach), where the term 
Pr(breach) captures the probability that a data breach occurs at the 
broker’s facility.228 
 
Concepts anticipates that the inputs to these formulas will be informed by 
the informal “examinations” described in Step 5. For formula (1), for example, 
Concepts states:  
“The actual value for Pr(attempt) will depend on the security and privacy 
controls that the data recipient has in place and the contractual controls 
that are being imposed as part of the data sharing agreement.”229 
 
However, as discussed in Section E above, the examination of a data 
purchaser’s “security and privacy controls” is not statistically or scientifically 
validated process, and there are no objective assessment criteria or auditing 
standards for conducting those examinations. As a result, the substance, quality 
and results of this “examination” are wholly determined by the party financially 
benefiting from it.  
 
Moreover, Step 7 does not require the parties to use objective numerical 
measurements. Instead, the parties can use any numbers they can locate in a 
published article. For example, in discussing which numbers should be used to 
calculate the “actual risk” of a data breach, Concepts says: 
“Data for 2010 show that 19 percent of health care organizations suffered 
a data breach within the previous year (HIMSS Analytics, 2010); data for 
2012 show that this number rose to 27 percent (HIMSS Analytics, 2012). 
These organizations were all following the HIPAA Security Rule. Note 
that these figures are averages and may be adjusted to account for 
variation.”230 
The passage allows the parties to use any of the numbers that can be found in a 
published article. If the parties want to use the 19% figure, they can. They can 
also use the 27% figure. Or if they want to make an adjustment “to account for 
variation,” they can do that as well.  
 
Notably, Concepts does not require healthcare organizations to confirm 
that the cited numbers are accurate. The 2012 HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT231 cited 
in Concepts, for example, does not state that “Data for 2010 show that 19 percent 
of health care organizations suffered a data breach within the previous year 
 
228 Id. at 229. 
229 El Emam & Malin, Concepts, supra note 158, at 229. 
230 Id. at 230. 
231 Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society, 2012 HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT: 
SECURITY OF PATIENT DATA (Apr. 2012) [hereinafter 2012 HIMMS ANALYTICS REPORT]. 
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(HIMSS Analytics, 2010); data for 2012 show that this number rose to 27 percent 
(HIMSS Analytics, 2012).”232 Rather, the 2012 HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT states: 
“In 2012, 27 percent of all respondents to this survey indicated their 
organization has had a security breach in the past 12 months (up from 19 
percent in 2010 and 13 percent in 2008); of those who reported a breach, 
69 percent experienced more than one.”233 
 
The percentages reported in the 2012 HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, therefore, 
did not apply to “health care organizations.” Rather, they applied to 250 
individuals who responded to a survey.234 There is an enormous difference 
between these two numbers. According to OCR’s ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON BREACHES OF UNSECURED PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION,235 for example, 
OCR received 222 reports of data breaches involving 500 or more patients in 
2012.236 The CMS’s MEDICARE PHYSICIAN AND OTHER SUPPLIER NPI REPORT 
FOR 2012237 lists over 900,000 physicians or suppliers, which does not include 
hospitals and many other “health care organizations.” Using OCR’s reported 
numbers in the numerator and CMS’s numbers in the denominator would give a 
percentage of approximately 0.025%. Concepts does not define what it means by 
the terms “health care organization” or “data breach,” but it is clear that Concepts’ 
estimates of 19% and 27%, respectively, misrepresents what was reported in 2012 
HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, and are orders of magnitude off from the actual 
percentages of healthcare organizations that experienced data breaches in those 
respective time periods.  
  
Notably, notwithstanding the inaccuracy of the statistics, Concepts appears 
to sanction their use regardless of what a healthcare organization discovers during 
its informal “examination” of a data broker’s security and privacy practices. So 
long as there is a “body of work” that includes the numbers, regardless of how 
inaccurate those numbers may be, Concepts allows the healthcare organization to 
 
232 El Emam & Malin, Concepts, supra note 158, at 230. 
233 See 2012 HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, supra note 230, at 5 (emphasis added). 
234 See 2012 HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, supra note 230, at 10 (“HIMSS Analytics invited a 
variety of individuals with experience in their healthcare organization’s privacy and security 
environment to participate in this telephone-based survey. The 250 respondents included …”). 
235 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON BREACHES OF UNSECURED PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION (2011-2012).  
236 Id. at 10 (“For breaches occurring in calendar year 2012, OCR received 222 reports of these 
larger breaches …”). 
237 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, MEDICARE PHYSICIAN AND OTHER SUPPLIER NATIONAL PROVIDER IDENTIFIER (NPI) 
AGGREGATE REPORT, Calendar Year 2012 (Oct. 31, 2017), https://data.cms.gov/Medicare-
Physician-Supplier/Medicare-Physician-and-Other-Supplier-National-Pro/i587-8mbi. 
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use those numbers without taking into account any specific risks applicable to the 
healthcare organization being “examined.”  
 
Concepts does not give an example of how it converts informal 
examinations of a data purchaser’s security and privacy practices into numerical 
values, but other permissive “de-identification guidelines” do. De-identification 
Guidelines,238 which closely follows Concepts’ blueprint and was reviewed by 
one of Concepts’ authors, does.239 
 
Like Concepts, De-identification Guidelines starts with the removal of 
direct identifiers.240 Also like Concepts, De-identifications Guidelines allows a 
healthcare organization to label indirect identifiers as “de-identified” if the broker 
agrees to restrictions in its “data sharing agreement.”241 Following Concepts’ 
blueprint, De-identification Guidelines requires examinations of a data broker’s 
“privacy and security controls”242 and “motives.”243 These examinations are not 
based on statistically or scientifically validated criteria or auditing standards. 
Rather, they are merely “qualitative assessments, resulting in values typically in 
the range of ‘low,’ ‘medium,’ or ‘high.’”244  
 
There is no scientific or mathematical foundation for converting the 
informally determined grades into empirically validated predictions. In order to 
perform the calculation, the parties are free to use whatever numbers they want if 
they can be found in another permissive “de-identification guideline.” De-
identification Guidelines provides the following table that “may be used as a 
guideline in determining what may be considered an acceptable estimate for the 
probability:”245 
 
238 De-identification Guidelines, supra note 159. 
239 Id. at 2, n.3, (acknowledging that De-identification Guidelines “is based largely on the risk-
based de-identification methodology developed by Dr. Khaled El Emam”) (citing, among other 
texts, El Emam, GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION, supra 
note 158). 
240 Id. at 8. 
241 Id. at 14. 
242 Id. at 14. 
243 Id. at 15. 
244 See, e.g., id. at 14. 
245 See id. at 15, (citing El Emam, GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL HEALTH 
INFORMATION, supra note 158, at 208). 
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Chart of “Acceptable Estimates” Appearing in De-identification Guidelines 
 
Privacy and Security 
Controls 















Under Concepts, using these numbers is “acceptable” because they have 
been previously published in a “de-identification guideline” written by one of 
Concepts’ authors.246 And the process is “repeatable” because copying numerical 
values from another “de-identification guidelines” will always result in the same 
conclusion.  
 
Similar to Concepts’ misapplication of the numerical values from 2012 
HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT discussed above,247 Concepts does not require these 
numerical values to be accurate or reflect empirically validated facts or risks 
applicable to the data broker. It is sufficient that the numbers used to calculate 
“actual re-identification risk” are simply copied from another publication in order 
to ensure the method is “repeatable.” 
 
 
V. PROTECTING UN-PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION 
 
A. Do Permissive “De-Identification Guidelines” Adhere to HIPAA’s 
Requirements? 
 
Concepts’ “de-identification” methods are substantially similar to those 
described in other permissive “de-identification guidelines.” These guidelines 
frequently cite one another as independent support and are often written or 
reviewed by the same authors. De-identification Guidelines,248 discussed above, is 
 
246 See supra Section IV.F (regarding Concepts’ use of numerical values being misquoted from the 
2012 HIMMS ANALYTICS REPORT, supra note 230, at 5, 10.  
247 See Part IV, Section F (regarding Concepts’ use of numerical values being misquoted from the 
2012 HIMMS ANALYTICS REPORT, supra note 230, at 5, 10). 
248 See supra Section IV.F (regarding the similarities between the methods described in De-
identification Guidelines and Concepts). 
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one such example.249 It acknowledges that its “approach to de-identification … is 
based largely on the risk-based de-identification methodology developed by [one 
of Concepts’ authors].”250 And De-identification Guidelines justifies using the 
unsubstantiated numerical values in its calculation of “actual re-identification 
risk” because those numbers were published in GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION 
OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION,251 also written by the same author. Concepts 
and De-identification Guidelines both reference Evaluating the Risk of Re-
identification as supplying the list of security and privacy practices that must be in 
place before a healthcare organization can apply the notably high “acceptable risk 
thresholds.” 252 The eleven-step process described in Part IV above, is 
substantially similar to the method described in GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION 
OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION.253  
 
The goals, methods and results of these permissive “de-identification 
guidelines” depart significantly from HIPAA’s requirements for de-identification. 
For nonpublic data releases, their objective is not to ensure that information 
labeled “de-identified” is sufficiently devoid of identifying information that it can 
be safely disseminated as contemplated by Section 502(d)(2).254 As a result, their 
form of “de-identified” information often can be used to identify many, most or 
even all of the patients involved, and can present the same category of risks to 
patients as individually identifiable health information. Accordingly, these 
guidelines assume that such “de-identified” information will be protected in a 
manner that, in certain respects (but not all), echoes what HIPAA requires for 
individually identifiable health information. 
 
Because their goals are different than HIPAA’s, permissive “de-
identification guidelines” do not adhere to HIPAA’s specifications for de-
identified health information. Concepts, for example, disregards three-quarters of 
Section 514(c)’s controls on how identification codes can be deployed. Indeed, 
permissive “de-identification guidelines” often expressly authorize healthcare 
organizations to let data brokers apply patient identification codes: 
 
249 See Part IV, Section F (regarding the similarities between the methods described in De-
identification Guidelines and Concepts). 
250 De-identification Guidelines, supra note 159, at 2, n.3. 
251 See id., at 15 (citing El Emam, GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL HEALTH 
INFORMATION, supra note 159, at 208).  
252 Cf. El Emam & Malin, Concepts, supra note 158, at 234, with De-Identification Guidelines, 
supra note 159, at 14. 
253 See e.g., El Emam, GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION, 
supra note 159, at 155.  
254 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (“The requirements of [HIPAA’s Privacy Rule] do not apply to 
information that has been de-identified in accordance with the applicable requirements of § 
164.514 …”). 
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The [healthcare organizations] may use the same algorithm to generate the 
pseudonyms for the [patients] so that the same [patient] in multiple 
datasets will have the same pseudonym. This way the [data broker] can 
perform anonymous linking of the datasets. Another example is where 
[patients] need to be tracked longitudinally, and there will be multiple data 
disclosures over time. To facilitate the anonymous linking of the different 
datasets, it would be desirable to have the same pseudonym used for the 
same [patients] over time.255 
 
The use of the term “anonymous” in this section does not require that the 
information is anonymous in the way it’s commonly understood. As with “de-
identified,” it only means that the patients’ medical records have had the direct 
identifiers removed and that the broker has agreed not to abuse its ability to use 
identification codes and indirect identifiers to identify patients. 
 
Nor do these “de-identification guidelines” adhere to the requirements of 
Section 514(b)(1)’s statistical confirmation method. They do not, for example, 
require healthcare organizations to apply “generally accepted statistical and 
scientific principles and methods for rendering information not identifiable.”256 
Nor are healthcare organizations required to consider all information reasonably 
available to a broker if the broker promises that it will not “re-identify” the 
information. Nor are healthcare organizations required to demonstrate that there is 
a very low probability that the information could be used to identify patients using 
generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for rendering 
information not identifiable.  
 
In place of Section 514(b)(1)’s requirements, these “de-identification 
guidelines” allow healthcare organizations to use non-statistical or non-scientific 
processes so long as they have been published in any “body of work” and give 
“repeatable” results. This is permitted even when those “repeatable” results are 
simply the result of copying unvalidated or misquoted numerical values from 
other publications.257 Healthcare organizations and their data broker customers are 
also given wide latitude to select their own “acceptable risk thresholds,” which 
can be orders of magnitude higher what generally accepted statistical and 
scientific methods and principles would consider a very low probability. Although 
these “de-identification guidelines” nominally require healthcare organizations to 
examine their customers’ security and privacy practices, commercial motivations 
 
255 Khaled El Emam & Anita Fineberg, An Overview of Techniques for De-identifying Personal 
Health information, CHEO RESEARCH INSTITUTE 19 (Aug. 14, 2009).  
256 See supra Section IV.F (regarding Concepts’ use of numerical values being misquoted from the 
2012 HIMMS Analytics Report, supra note 230, that are likely orders of magnitude off of an 
accurate estimate of the real-world phenomena measured using empirically supported methods). 
257 See Part IV, Section F (regarding Concepts’ use of numerical values being misquoted from the 
2012 HIMMS ANALYTICS REPORT, supra note 230, that are likely orders of magnitude off of an 
accurate estimate of the real world phenomena measured using empirically supported methods). 
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and conflicts-of-interest, those examinations are not conducted in accordance with 
independently validated assessment criteria or auditing standards. As a result, the 
substance, quality and results of these “examinations” are left solely to the 
healthcare organization whose payment from the data broker is dependent on 
favorable conclusions. Furthermore, the calculation of “actual re-identification 
risk” utilizes inputs that are not the result of any statistically or scientifically 
validated measurement instrument.  
 
These “de-identification guidelines” also depart from Section 514(b)(1)’s 
requirements regarding who participates in the process. Because Section 
514(b)(1)’s express language protects de-identified health information solely 
through the application of bona fide statistical and scientific methods, 
Section 514(b)(1) only contemplates that a qualified de-identification statistician 
is involved in its process.258 The scope of the “informal examinations” required 
by permissive “de-identification guidelines,” on the other hand, covers a wide 
range of topics far beyond the professional competence of a statistician. In order 
for those “examinations” to be effective, the statistician would also need legal 
expertise to meaningfully evaluate the data broker’s data use agreement, 
information security expertise to evaluate the broker’s security practices, expertise 
in privacy laws to assess the broker’s privacy programs, expertise in assessing 
corporate conflicts-of-interest and corporate and human motivations, and 
expertise in effectively conducting audits or internal investigations of each of 
these very different domains. The “de-identification guidelines” do not articulate 
if and which experts must be engaged to perform these wide-ranging 
examinations. Nor do they discuss the professional qualifications or independence 
of such professionals. Nor do the guidelines discuss that Section 514(b)(1) makes 
no reference to having lawyers, security engineers, corporate ethics professionals 
or auditors involved in determining whether patient information could be used to 
identify patients.  
 
The “de- identification guidelines” depart from Section 514(b)(2)’s 
requirements as well. They do not require, for example, that healthcare 
organizations remove all of the identifiers listed in Section 514(b)(2)(i). Because 
they allow the parties to label information “de-identified” even in circumstances 
where the healthcare organization knows the information can be used by the 
broker to identify patients, the guidelines cannot be used in their current form 
without violating Section 514(b)(2)(ii).  
 
 
258 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1) (describing the qualified statistician as a “person with appropriate 
knowledge of and experience with generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and 
methods for rendering information not individually identifiable.”). 
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B. Do Permissive “De-Identification Guidelines” Encourage Healthcare 
Organizations to Disregard HIPAA’s Requirements? 
 
The permissive “de-identification guidelines” at times suggest that their 
methods comply with HIPAA’s requirements. As discussed in Section C of Part 
IV, for example, Concepts describes 514(c) of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule as not 
imposing “any controls” on a spreadsheet that links patient identifiers with 
identification codes. And as discussed in Section D of Part IV, Concepts interprets 
Section 514(b)(1) as permitting healthcare organizations to use any method 
justified by a body of work that is generally known. Although both are incorrect 
interpretations of HIPAA’s requirements, they evince an aspiration to comply 
with HIPAA. 
 
There are other times, however, where permissive “de-identification 
guidelines” acknowledge that their use of the word “de-identified” is distinct from 
any legal definition of the term, including HIPAA’s. For example, GUIDE TO THE 
DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION states: 
“It should also be noted that the amount of de-identification that is applied 
is influenced by external factors that must be taken into account: 
precedents, regulatory requirements and signals, and the public’s 
expectations … Regulators may indicate preferences for certain amounts 
of de-identifications through regulations, orders, and guidance 
documents.” 259 
In this passage “regulatory requirements” are characterized as “external factors” 
that exist independently of what it means for medical records to be “de-
identified.” Further, the passage suggests that “regulatory requirements” are 
simply “preferences” for “certain amounts of de-identification.” Both suggestions 
indicate that these significantly permissive guidelines fail to understand HIPAA’s 
framework. 
 
Under HIPAA, de-identification is defined by its regulatory requirements. 
Sections 514(b) and (c) are not “external factors,” and there is no such thing as 
“de-identified health information” that does not comply with all of HIPAA’s 
requirements. Information that does not meet all of those requirements remains 
individually identifiable health information. Even when a large number of patient 
identifiers has been removed – such as with a limited  dataset – that information 
must be safeguarded in accordance with HIPAA’s requirements. “De-
identification” is not something that can be “stretched” to meet the needs of a 
healthcare organization or its financial objectives. As discussed in Section D of 
Part III, HIPAA offers many options for using individually identifiable health 
information for bona fide research purposes that do not involve misclassifying 
patient information as “de-identified.”  
 
 
259 El Emam, GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION, supra note 
159, at 153.  
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Despite the significant discrepancies between the guidelines’ definition of 
“de-identified” and that of HIPAA, the guidelines do not explicitly acknowledge 
them. Thus, by using the homonym “de-identified” to describe the results of their 
process, these guidelines invite parties to disregard HIPAA’s express 
requirements in favor of their own. This, in turn, invites healthcare organizations 
to make the following presumptions:  
• Patient identifiers do not need to be protected in accordance with the 
security standards set forth in HIPAA’s Security Rule; 
• Patients do not need to be notified in accordance with HIPAA’s Breach 
Notification Rule when the patient identifiers have been accessed in a 
hack or any other manner not authorized under the Privacy Rule;  
• Neither the patient identifiers, nor the healthcare organization’s or data 
broker’s disclosure, receipt or maintenance of such patient identifiers, are 
subject to the jurisdiction of HIPAA’s Enforcement Rule; 
• The patient identifiers can be used, disclosed or sold to any third party for 
any purpose, including those that would violate HIPAA’s Privacy Rule 
were the information acknowledged to be identifiable; 
• The parties do not need to obtain patients’ authorizations in accordance 
with Section 508260 of the Privacy Rule, even when the patient identifiers 
are neither limited  datasets261 nor obtained pursuant to a privacy board’s 
waiver of authorization in accordance with Section 512(i) of the Privacy 
Rule;262 and 
• Patients do not need to be notified in an accounting of disclosures under 
Section 528(a)(1) of the Privacy Rule,263 even when the patient identifiers 
are neither limited  datasets264 nor received pursuant to a valid 
authorization.265 
 
This confusion regarding the homonym “de-identified” can easily result in 
harms to patient privacy. Patients, for example, have no assurance that any of 
HIPAA’s safeguards will be applied to their medical records once they are labeled 
“de-identified,” regardless of how easily those “de-identified” records can be used 
to identify them. The permissive “de-identification guidelines” ostensibly require 
that identifiable forms of “de-identified” information be protected with “stringent 
 
260 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a). 
261 Id. at § 164.528(a)(1)(viii). 
262 Id. at § 164.512(i). 
263 Id. at § 164.528(a)(1). 
264 Id. at § 164.528(a)(1)(viii). 
265 Brief of Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 522 (2011) (No.10-799), 
http://epic.org/amicus/sorrell/EPIC_amicus_Sorrell_final.pdf [hereinafter EPIC Brief] at 20, 23-4.   
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controls,” but they leave it to financially conflicted parties to determine how 
“stringent” those “controls” must be. 
 
Pleadings in Sorrell offer a glimpse of the potential impact of 
misclassifying identifiable information as “de-identified.” An amicus brief filed in 
the case alleged that data broker, IMS, used a cryptographic algorithm known as 
“MD5” to generate identification codes that IMS used to track healthcare 
organizations’ patients.266 It is also alleged that IMS continued to use the MD5 for 
many years after MD5 had been publicly compromised. After over a decade of 
warnings by security researchers, in the mid-2000s two teams of researchers 
published that they had “cracked” MD5 using ordinary desktop computers. This 
led to MD5 to be declared “cryptographically broken” in 2005267 and “unsuitable 
for further use” by Department of Homeland Security’s Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team in 2008.268 It appears, however, that IMS may have been 
unaware that MD5 had been compromised. An IMS general manager, for 
example, testified that its identification codes were secure and “there is no way 
that you can actually reverse engineer the data back to a patient.”269  
 
If these allegations are correct and IMS was unaware of MD5’s 
vulnerabilities, this could be because it viewed patients’ identification codes as 
“de-identified.” Although there are many ways that any identification code can be 
compromised in a way that results in patient identification, IMS may have 
concluded that it had no obligation under HIPAA to safeguard those identifiers. 
IMS also may not have implemented appropriate systems to detect when the 
patients’ identification codes are used or disclosed in a way that compromises 
patient privacy. And it is unclear whether IMS would notify patients if such a 
compromise occurred. 
 
This contrasts sharply with how HIPAA treats identification codes. If, for 
example, the identification codes were generated in accordance with 
Section 514(c), HIPAA’s Security Rule would require healthcare organizations 
assigning those codes to conduct thorough and accurate risk assessments of the 
potential risks and vulnerabilities.270 It would also require healthcare 
 
266 Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. Supporting 
Petitioners, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (No. 10-799), 
https://epic.org/amicus/sorrell/EPIC_amicus_Sorrell_final.pdf [hereinafter EPIC Brief], at 20, 23-
24. 
267 Id. at 24.  
268 Id. 
269 Testimony of General Manager for IMS Health’s Business Line Management, quoted in id., at 
20. 
270 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii). 
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organizations to protect against “any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards.”271 
Healthcare organizations would be required to be informed about MD5’s well-
known defects. They also would be required to implement systems to detect any 
compromise of their patients’ identification codes and to notify patients if a 
compromise results in the use or disclosure of their patients’ medical information 
in unauthorized ways or to unauthorized parties. 
 
C. Are Permissive “De-Identification Guidelines” Being Utilized by 
Healthcare Organizations in Lieu of HIPAA’s Requirements? 
 
Given the notorious secrecy surrounding the sale of patient medical 
information,272 it is impossible to be certain whether or how many healthcare 
organizations utilize the permissive “de-identification guidelines” in lieu of 
HIPAA’s express requirements. Tanner’s exposé, however, indicates that at least 
some healthcare organizations may.  
 
Recalling Tanner’s discussion of data broker software that replaces direct 
identifiers with identification codes,273 it appears that a number of healthcare 
organizations allow data brokers to assign their patients’ identification codes. 
Tanner’s account is bolstered by information in the Sorrell litigation, where 
testimony from an employee of one of IMS’s agents, Verispan, revealed the way 
IMS’ agent used “linking codes” to allow IMS to follow patients throughout their 
lives: 
“What we do is … strip out all of the identifiable information, and replace 
it with the serial linking code […] so that every time an entity comes into 
the database, it’s replaced with the same code.  So you can follow an 
individual over time […]”274 
 
On its face, this practice appears to violate a number of Section 514(c)’s 
controls, as more fully discussed in Section B of Part III above. Not only do 
healthcare organizations allow data brokers (or their agents) to apply the patients’ 
identification codes, they also allow the brokers (on their own or through agents) 
to control how those codes are used. They can be used by a broker and its agent, 
for example, to aggregate an unlimited amount of additional information about 
 
271 See discussion supra Part I (regarding the secrecy surrounding the sales of patient medical 
information).  
272 See discussion supra Section III.B.  
273 See discussion in Section B of Part III above. 
274 See EPIC Brief, supra note 265, at 20,26-27 (quoting the trial testimony of Jody Fisher, Vice 
President of Verispan’s Product Management, C.A. App. A99 (emphasis added). Notably, the first 
clause of this quote is unlikely to be wholly accurate. As noted in Concepts, if you replaces “all of 
the identifying information” with a code, “the resulting data, in almost all cases, will not be useful 
for analytic purposes.” 274 More likely, the only information that has likely been “strip[ped] out” 
by the code are the patients’ direct identifiers and a limited number of indirect identifiers.). 
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patients. That ability, in turn, gives the broker (or its agent) the ability to use those 
identification codes – alone or in combination with the technology used to 
generate them or other patient information – to identify many, most or all of the 
healthcare organizations’ patients. Regardless of whether or not the broker (or its 
agent) ever abuses this ability, the healthcare organization has disclosed patient 
information that could be used – alone or in combination with other information – 
to identify its patients. 
 
The permissive “de-identification guidelines” place no specific restrictions 
on how identification codes are utilized. Consequently, they permit healthcare 
organizations to apply the label “de-identified” to their patients’ identification 
codes even in circumstances where they can be used – directly or indirectly – to 
identify 100% of the healthcare organizations’ patients.  
 
With respect to HIPAA’s requirements in Section 514(b), Tanner notes 
that “[d]ata scientists can now circumvent HIPAA’s privacy protections by … 
marrying [data brokers’] anonymized patient dossiers with named consumer 
profiles available elsewhere – with a surprising degree of accuracy.”275 On its 
face, this appears to contradict Section 514(b)(1)’s requirement that “the risk is 
very small that the information could be used, alone or in combination with other 
reasonably available information, by the [data broker] to identify [a patient].”276 
It also appears to contradict Section 514(b)(2)(ii) that does not allow information 
to be considered de-identified when the healthcare organization knows that “the 
information could be used alone or in combination with other information to 
identify [a patient].”277 
 
Permissive “de-identification guidelines” take a markedly different 
approach. Once a data broker enters into a contract, the healthcare organization 
can disregard any “other information” available to the data broker that could be 
combined with patient medical information to identify patients. As a result, even 
when the identification codes and “other information” can be used by the data 
broker to identify 100% of the healthcare organization’s patients, these guidelines 
allow the label “de-identified” to be applied. 
 
D. Do Permissive “De-Identification Guidelines” Provide an Effective Data 
Protection Alternative to HIPAA’s Definition of De-Identified Information? 
 
In their current form, permissive “de-identification guidelines” incorporate 
too many vulnerabilities to operate as an alternative to HIPAA’s data protection 
framework. These guidelines, for example, provide no unambiguous or 
measurable requirements for what kinds of data use agreements warrant allowing 
 
275 Thielman, supra note 1.  
276 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added). 
277 Id. at § 164.514(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). 
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identifiable information to be labeled “de-identified.” They also provide no 
unambiguous or measurable requirements for assessing a data broker’s security or 
privacy practices, conflicts-of-interests or commercial motivations. Nor do they 
provide unambiguous or measurable auditing criteria to ensure that the 
examinations of those topics are likely to uncover information relevant to the 
purported inquiries. Nor is there any method for converting the results of those 
examinations into numerical values that have been scientifically or statistically 
demonstrated to have any predictive accuracy. This precludes the calculation of 
“actual re-identification risk” from serving as an objective measure. Likewise, 
there is no objective criteria for defining the limits of what the parties can select 
for their “acceptable risk thresholds.” 
 
The vulnerabilities arising from the dearth of unambiguous or measurable 
requirements are compounded by manifest conflicts-of-interest created by these 
permissive guidelines. The guidelines, for example, allow healthcare 
organizations who are financially benefiting from labeling their identifiable 
patient information as “de-identified” to play a dispositive role in selecting its 
own “acceptable risk threshold” and in determining the substance and 
effectiveness of the broker’s data use agreement, security and privacy practices, 
conflicts-of-interest and commercial motivations. This, in turn, gives the 
healthcare organizations dispositive influence over the purportedly objective 
calculation of “actual re-identification risk.” The guidelines do not acknowledge 
the conflicts-of-interest they create, and thereby include no mechanisms for 
mitigating their influence. As such, they are ripe for abuse by parties who seek the 
imprimatur of a “process” for labeling identifiable medical records as “de-
identified.” These guidelines are incapable of distinguishing between healthcare 
organizations and brokers who have no desire to abuse patient privacy from those 
that do.  
 
Analytically, the permissive “de-identification guidelines” will remain a 
viable differential privacy framework until they effectively address identification 
risks arising from combining multiple data sources. The types of data routinely 
available to data brokers about specific patients includes information from other 
care settings, longitudinal data, information about relatives and household 
members who may have overlapping healthcare histories. Any method that only 
measures the “identifiability” of each individual data source on its own – or solely 
in combination with public records – fails to consider the many situations where 
combinations of nominally “de-identified” information can be used to identify 
patients.  
 
As previously discussed, for example, the Sweeny study indicated that 
87% of the U.S. population could be identified using only their gender, date of 
birth and zip code.278 If a data broker possessed identification codes for 200 
million patients that are linked to their gender, date of birth and zip code, the 
 
278 See Sweeney, supra note 40, at 2. 
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broker would possess the ability to compromise 174 million of those 
identification codes. The broker’s ability to link those 174 million identification 
codes to the correct patients is 100%. This vulnerability exists even if no single 
data source contains all of the necessary indirect identifiers. If the broker has one  
dataset that only includes each of the patients’ gender and age, and then purchases 
a second  dataset that has their zip codes, the broker now possesses enough 
information that could be used to identify 174 million individuals.  
 
This is a general phenomenon, and thus can arise from longitudinal 
records about the same patient that come from a single source, as was shown in 
the lab results study discussed earlier where researchers identified patients in a 
database of biometric information that had been redacted in accordance with 
Section 514(b)(2)(i). 279 The study found that the ability to identify patients 
represented in the database increased dramatically when researchers could 
compare it to the patient’s longitudinal health information.280 When researchers 
could utilize the known results for four consecutive PCV panels, for example, 
they had 19.5% chance of uniquely identifying a patient in the redacted 
biomedical database.281 And when researchers had access to six consecutive 
panels, the rate jumped to 89%.282  
 
These “de-identification guidelines” also lack a way to effectively model 
the identification risk of databases comprising multiple individuals. Averaging is 
incapable of describing the systemic risk arising from including increasing 
numbers of individuals in a single database. The likelihood of being able to 
identify “at least one” patient – or “at least n-number of patients” – from an ever-
increasing database, for example, cannot be adequately modeled by simply 
averaging all of the patients’ isolated risk scores. Nor can averaging effectively 
describe identification risk arising from patients who may be related to one 
another in a way that increases their respective risk of identification. Nor can 
averaging depict how the compromise of one patient’s identity increases the 
identification risk to other patients in the same database, creating cascading 
identification scenarios. 
 
The American Medical Association’s recently issued AMA PRIVACY 
PRINCIPLES describes “appropriate de-identification” as “using techniques that are 
demonstrably robust, scalable, transparent, and provable.”283 The current 
 
279 See Atreya, supra note 115, at 95. 
280 Id. at 98. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
283 AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICAL PRIVACY PRINCIPLES 1 (May 11, 2020), (“Privacy rights should be 
honored unless they are waived by an individual in a meaningful way, the information is 
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E. The Elephant in the Room 
 
Independent standards bodies often partner with regulators and academic 
researchers to create thoroughly vetted industry standards for handling sensitive 
information. These standards address legal requirements and continuously 
evolving use-cases and security risks. They are also used by independent testing 
labs to audit companies to ensure that they are complying with those practices. 
The Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council is a standards body that 
maintains standards for technologies that protect credit card numbers and 
validates auditing procedures for ensuring compliance with those standards.284 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology plays a similar role for 
technologies protecting sensitive information, such as cryptographic 
algorithms.285  
 
There is no equivalent oversight over the protection of medical records 
that have been labeled “de-identified.” On the contrary, “[t]he trade in patient data 
is so opaque that many even in health care and government do not know about 
it.”286 The moment that healthcare organizations apply the label “de-identified” to 
their patients’ medical records – regardless of how easily they can be used to 
identify the patients – all proactive oversight appears to vanish. This has led to the 
remarkable circumstance where a patient’s credit card number is currently given 
substantially greater protection than her identifiable medical records that have 
been labeled “de-identified.” 
 
If your cardholder data is compromised, for example, you have reasonable 
assurance that this will be detected and that you will be notified about what data 
was compromised and what actions you should take to protect yourself. This 
contrasts sharply with how your medical information is protected the moment the 
label “de-identified” is slapped onto it.  
 
It is unclear whether there is proactive oversight once your medical 
records are labeled “de-identified,” regardless of how easily those records can be 
 
appropriately de-identified (using techniques that are demonstrably robust, scalable, transparent, 
and provable …”) [hereinafter AMA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES]. 
284 See, e.g., THE PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, PCI DATA 
SECURITY STANDARD (PCI DSS), REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES, 
Version 3.2.1, (May 2018). 
285 See, e.g., NIST SP 800-107, supra note 98; NIST, NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-57 PART 1 
REVISION 4, RECOMMENDATION FOR KEY MANAGEMENT, PART 1: GENERAL (Jan. 2016). 
286 Tanner, The Hidden Trade in Medical Data, supra note 2. 
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used to identify you. Compromise of your identifiable “de-identified” medical 
records may or may not be detected. Even if it is detected, you may not be 
informed. Because your medical records have been labeled “de-identified,” a 
broker may decide to use and disclose your information in ways that would be 
prohibited under the Privacy Rule if the identifiability of those records were 
acknowledged. Even if a broker does not directly sell your medical records to 
your health insurer or your employer, the broker may decide to “train” algorithms 
and create and then sell a “propensity model” or a “risk score” about you based on 
your medical records and identification code. They would be sold as “predictions” 
about you notwithstanding the fact that those “predictions” convey information 
derived from your actual medical records.  
 
The current gaps in the proactive enforcement of HIPAA’s requirements 
have prompted the AMA to call for greater effective oversight – in its recent 
AMA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, it called for entities to “make their de-identification 
processes and techniques publicly available.”287  
 
Four brief provisions of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule – Sections 514(a)-(c) and 
502(d) – are all that safeguards the petabytes worth of patient information for 
hundreds of millions of Americans. It is critical, therefore, that the requirements 
of these provisions are understood, enforced and complied with. 
 
For healthcare organizations, compliance starts with being informed of 
their obligations under the Privacy Rule. Unless all of Section 514(b)-(c)’s 
requirements are fully satisfied, the health information in question remains 
individually identifiable health information subject to HIPAA’s comprehensive 
data protection requirements. Furthermore, even after information has been de-
identified, healthcare organizations cannot forget that it is always possible it will 
revert back into identifiable health information and, thereby, once again be 
subject to HIPAA’s protections.288 Nor can healthcare organizations disregard 
widely known risks to patient privacy arising from implementations of 
identification codes or the aggregation of patient information that can be used to 
identify patients. HIPAA’s Security and Breach Notification Rules do not permit 
healthcare organizations to remain “willfully ignorant” of “potential risks and 




Regulators have a central role to play in fostering transparency and 
accountability. There are many red flags indicating that a significant amount of 
health information labeled “de-identified” can be used to identify many, most or 
even all of the patients involved. The first step regulators should take, therefore, is 
 
287 AMA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, at 3. 
288 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2)(ii). 
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to stay informed about how “de-identification” is actually being conducted in 
commercial settings by exercising their compliance review authority.289 Second, 
regulators should report their findings so that “de-identification” practices can be 
independently reviewed by data protection researchers to ensure that they align 
with HIPAA’s express requirements and utilize up-to-date safeguards to address 
current uses and accompanying threats. Third, regulators should use those 
learnings to update existing guidance to ensure that all of requirements listed in 
Sections 514(b)-(c) and 502(b) are appropriately accounted for. Given the 
extraordinary sensitivity of health information, regulators should promote the 
adoption of documented industry standards for the use of identification codes and 
de-identification that are no less sophisticated than what exists in cryptography or 
other mature confidentiality domains. 
 
Even if regulatory bodies are slow to act, advocates have been successful 
in bringing private claims against healthcare organizations that violate HIPAA’s 
requirements. Although HIPAA does not give patients an express private right of 
action, courts have routinely found that HIPAA and its implementing regulations 
may be utilized to inform the standard of care applicable to claims arising from 
the inappropriate disclosure of patient information.290 Healthcare organizations 
that disclose health information that can be used to identify their patients to 
entities that would not be otherwise entitled to receive it under HIPAA’s Privacy 
Rule violate HIPAA’s requirements. And healthcare organizations that receive a 
payment in exchange for disclosing such information may also be violating 
HIPAA’s prohibition against selling it without the patient’s written 
authorization.291 In situations where laws remain unenforced, direct litigation may 
be the final avenue available to patients seeking to protect their privacy against 
the mislabeling of their clearly identifiable information as “de-identified.” 
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